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SUPPOSE YOU ARE a movie producer seeking to hire an actor to
play the part of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. In selecting the appropri-
ate thespian, you would want someone with a strong, clear voice who
could make the inspiring words and actions of Dr. King come alive
and embody his charisma. There are many fine actors and actresses
who could do justice to the part, but for seemingly obvious reasons
you desire to cast a black man in the role, thereby excluding all wo-
men, whites, Asians, and Hispanics. Suppose also that a qualified white
actress initiated a Title VIII disparate treatment claim against you
based on your admitted refusal to hire her because of her sex and
race. 2 As to the sex discrimination claim, Title VII provides you with a
defense that sex is a bona fide occupational qualification 3 ("BFOQ"),
and if you can establish this defense, you would prevail on that claim.
However, as to the race claim, you would lose because Title VII does
* J.D., St. Louis University School of Law (1997). The author is an attorney
specializing in labor and employment law. He wishes to thank Mr. Day Krolik of NBC for
his helpful comments and suggestions.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
2. She might also have a disparate impact claim, as a plaintiff may proceed under
both a disparate impact and disparate treatment theory. See Lynch v. Freeman, 817 F.2d
380, 382 (6th Cir. 1987). "Disparate impact claims, recognized in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971) .. . ,do not require proof of intent to discriminate. Instead, they focus
on facially neutral employment practices that create such statistical disparities disadvantag-
ing members of a protected group that they are 'functionally equivalent to intentional
discrimination."' Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 299 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988)). This Article, however, only addresses
intentional discrimination or disparate treatment claims.
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1994).
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not provide a BFOQ defense for race or color discrimination. 4 To
some people, this seems absurd, particularly in light of the general
belief that there is nothing morally wrong with discriminating in an
effort to depict historical persons authentically.5 Yet others recognize
that in some instances the justification for discriminating against mi-
nority actors is much less compelling, such as when the race or color
of the actors is peripheral to a fictional story or to the ideas the direc-
tor hopes to convey, or where the skin color of dancers makes no
appreciable difference to the production. 6
However, the hypothetical posed above continues to exist only in
the realm of theory as no one has ever initiated such a lawsuit. There-
fore, it is uncertain how courts would address such a case. If presented
with such a lawsuit, would a court extend Title VII's sex, religion, and
national origin BFOQ to reach race or color? Or would the court see
this type of discrimination as no different than other invidious acts
that Title VII was clearly designed to prohibit? Further, assuming that
the court would judicially create a race BFOQ would this be an in-
stance of improper judicial activism contrary to the clear intent of Ti-
tle VII? Or would it be a court simply filling in the interstices of a
vague statute? Or should Congress just head-off this entire conun-
drum by amending the Title VII BFOQ provision to permit race and
color discrimination in certain situations?
This Article attempts to answer these and other questions in an
effort to determine whether there is a need for a race or color BFOQ
to protect purportedly benign discriminatory practices in the news
and entertainment industries. Part I summarizes the BFOQ defense as
the federal courts have refined it. Part II discusses the reasons why
Congress did not include race or color in the BFOQ provision. Part III
analyzes the various justifications for BFOQs, particularly those that
might be applicable to race or color discrimination in the news and
entertainment industries. Part IV examines whether the judicial crea-
tion of a race or color BFOQ is legally feasible or desirable. Finally,
4. See Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1308 (7th Cir. 1989). Race as a BFOQ
is also not a defense to an equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1981. See Ferrill
v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 474 (11th Cir. 1999). However, the Seventh Circuit has
essentially recognized a race BFOQ defense to a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 action for a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause. See Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 920-21 (7th Cir.
1996).
5. See K. Anthony Appiah, Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity, 88 CAL. L. REV. 41, 47
(2000).
6. See GregoryJ. Peterson, The Rockettes: Out of Step with the Times? An Inquiry into the
Legality of Racial Discrimination in the Performing Arts, 9 CoLuM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 351, 358-63
(1985).
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Part V determines whether legislative action is war'ranted. This Article
concludes that the rules of statutory construction and judicial re-
straint prevent the judiciary from crafting a race or color BFOQ. Fur-
thermore, legislative action is not presently warranted because no
cases have been brought where an employer could assert a race
BFOQ. Moreover, there is a danger that a generally applicable race or
color BFOQ would protect genuine invidious discrimination. Should
circumstances change, however, legislative action might become nec-
essary, especially to protect instances of benign discrimination in the
news and entertainment industries.
I. The Contours of the BFOQ Defense
A. Congressional Establishment of the BFOQ Defense
In Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,7 Congress recognized
that many employers were discriminating against employees or poten-
tial employees based on characteristics such as race and sex.8 Such
practices were harmful not just to the affected individuals, but also to
the nation's economy.9 Therefore, Congress prohibited discrimina-
tion on the basis of an employee's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin in hiring, terminating, and promoting employees, and
with respect to determining terms and conditions of employment. 10
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
8. See S. REP. No. 88-872 (1964), 1964 WL 4755 ("The purpose of [the Act] is to
achieve a peaceful and voluntary settlement of the persistent problem of racial and relig-
ious discrimination or segregation by establishments doing business with the general pub-
lic, and by labor unions and professional, business, and trade associations.").
9. Of course, the individual most harmed by the discriminatory practices is often the
discriminator himself.
[P]eople who decide that they do not want to trade with or hire certain people
because of race, sex, or age are making a decision that has more than just exter-
nal costs. They bear a large part of the costs themselves, for their decision will
surely limit their own opportunities for advancement and success, even as it leaves
others free to pursue alternate opportunities. The greater the class of persons
who are regarded as off-limits, and the more irrational the preferences, the more
the decision will hurt the people who make it ....
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPL'OYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAws 41-42 (1992).
10. See42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (i) (1994) (prohibiting intentional or disparate treat-
ment discrimination). Title VII also prohibits so-called "disparate impact" discrimination.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2) (1994). Title VII has multiple purposes. The foremost is to
eliminate discrimination in the workplace. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co.,
513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995). It is also designed to remedy the effect of discrimination and the
segregation of employees in the workplace, including stereotypical job assignments. See
Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1557 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc). Congress hoped that
Title VII would force employers to evaluate their employment practices in an effort to
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However, Congress also recognized that sometimes discrimination on
these bases was not only morally acceptable, but also made sound eco-
nomic sense. Through the bona fide occupational qualification
("BFOQ") affirmative defense provision of Title VII, 11 Congress
deemed it legally permissible to discriminate intentionally on some of
these bases in narrowly defined instances. 12 Later, Congress extended
this same protection to employers covered by the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act' 3 ("ADEA"). 14 It did this so that employers would
not have to change the essential nature of their businesses in order to
comply with Title VII and the ADEA. 15 The relevant portion of Title
VII's BFOQ provision states:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to hire and employ employees ... on the basis of his religion, sex,
or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise .... 16
Notably, the only three grounds for a BFOQ defense are sex, re-
ligion, and national origin, not race or color. Sex is the most com-
monly asserted BFOQ along with age in the ADEA context. National
eliminate discrimination, would deter future discrimination, and would help to compen-
sate plaintiffs for the injuries caused by discriminatory practices. See McKennon, 513 U.S. at
358.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1994). See EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1511
n.3 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The bona fide occupational qualification defense is essentially an
affirmative defense."). The BFOQ defense applies only to cases of intentional discrimina-
tion, not to cases of disparate impact. See Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 473
(11th Cir. 1999); MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1146 n.14 (3d Cir. 1988).
However, the BFOQ defense has a counterpart applicable to disparate impact cases-the
defense of business necessity. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (])(A) (i) (1994); In re Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 905 F.2d 1457, 1460-61 (1 1th Cir. 1990). The business necessity de-
fense is not applicable to cases of intentional discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2)
(1994).
12. Under Title VII, an employer may lawfully discriminate if the discrimination is in
accordance with legitimate affirmative actions programs, national security interests, senior-
ity systems, or done in a foreign nation in compliance with foreign law. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-l(b) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(g), (h) (1994).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
14. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1) (1994). The standards for applying the ADEA BFOQ are
substantially similar to those for Title VII. See I MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT
LAw § 2.37, at 327 (2d ed. 1999). Therefore, many of the decisions cited or discussed in
this Article are ADEA cases.
15. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989); Fragante v. City &
County of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir. 1989).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1994). The ADEA also allows employers to discriminate
based on age in certain instances under that statute's BFOQ provision. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(f)(1) (1994).
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origin is almost never proffered as a BFOQ t 7 and because other
broader exceptions protect religious discrimination, religion is rarely
advanced as a BFOQ.18 Congress drafted the BFOQ exception nar-
rowly and the courts have construed it as such.' 9 The BFOQ defense
applies only to the hiring, firing, and promoting of employees and to
job assignment decisions.20 It is not a defense to harassment or dis-
criminatory pay scales or benefits. 21 The employer bears the burden
of establishing the defense, 22 which usually involves a case-by-case,
"fact-intensive inquiry."23 For these reasons, summary judgment fre-
quently is inappropriate when an employer asserts a BFOQ defense. 24
B. The Elements of the BFOQ Defense
To prove a BFOQ defense, the defendant must show that for
some reason the sex, religion, or national origin of the rejected plain-
17. See George Rutherglen, Discrimination and Its Discontents, 81 VA. L. REv. 117, 140
(1995).
18. But see Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 803 F.2d 351, 354 (7th Cir. 1986) (af-
firming summary judgment based on religion BFOQ). Even in Pime, however, it is probable
that the plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and thus the relig-
ion BFOQ was likely unnecessary. See id. at 355 (Posner, J., concurring).
19. As the Supreme Court stated, "The BFOQ defense is written narrowly, and this
Court has read it narrowly." Int'l Union v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991)
[hereinafter Johnson Controls I/]; W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 412 (1985);
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977). As Judge Posner noted, "A broad reading
would gut the statute. For it is unlikely that most employment discrimination in the private
sector is irrational. Few private employers discriminate without having some reason for
doing so ...." Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 903 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Posner, J., dissenting), rev'd, 499 U.S. 187 (1991) [hereinafter Johnson Controls 1].
20. See Cianciolo v. City of Knoxville, 376 F. Supp. 719, 721 (E.D. Tenn. 1974). As
noted by the court in Cianciolo:
Although this section speaks only to hiring and firing, its operation also impliedly
applies to employment opportunities. Thus, if an employer restricted the activi-
ties of an employee because the same was "necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise," then the employer would be relieved of his
statutory obligations under the Act.
Id.
21. See EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1986).
22. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989); Fallon v. Illinois, 882
F.2d 1206, 1216 (7th Cir. 1989).
2-3. See Criswell 472 U.S. at 417-23; Gately v. Massachusetts, 2 F.3d 1221, 1227 (1st Cir.
1993).
24. See Johnson Controls !, 886 F.2d at 906 (Posner, J., dissenting); EEOC v. Boeing Co.,
843 F.2d 1213, 1216 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The validity of a BFOQ turns upon factual findings,
preferably ones by ajury."); Childers v. Morgan County Bd. of Educ., 817 F.2d 1556, 1559
(11 th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) ("Cases which rely heavily on expert testimony, as is the case
here, do not easily lend themselves to summary judgment. Indeed most of the public safety
age discrimination cases seem to have been resolved at trial.").
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tiff substantially interferes with his or her ability to perform the job.25
In cases of sex discrimination, the employer must show that "given the
reasonable objectives of the employer, the very womanhood or very
manhood of the employee undermines his or her capacity to perform
a job satisfactorily. ' 26 The defense has two parts: the importance of
the end the employment restriction serves; and the closeness of the
relationship between the discriminatory means and the end purport-
edly served. Like the means/end analysis of sex-based, equal protec-
tion cases, courts apply heightened scrutiny with a BFOQ defense,
although not the strictest scrutiny. 27
1. Importance of the Purpose Being Served
First, the employer must show that the purpose the employment
restriction serves is related to the "essence" or "central mission" of its
business.2H As the quoted language indicates, mere convenience to an
employer will neverjustify a BFOQ.29 Rather, the employer must show
that age, religion, sex, or national origin is essential to the applicant's
ability to perform "the job from which the applicant is excluded."3 1 If
an essential function is not at stake, an employer cannot justify dis-
25. See Johnson Controls II, 499 U.S. 187, 204 (1991) (discussing sex discrimination).
The BFOQ defense is not available for claims of race, color, or ethnicity discrimination. See
Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1308 (7th Cir. 1989).
26. Torres v. Wis. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1528 (7th Cir. 1988)
(en banc).
27. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 64 (2000) ("Although it is true that
the existence of the [BFOQJ defense makes the ADEA's prohibition of age discrimination
less than absolute, the Act's substantive requirements nevertheless remain at a level akin to
the Court's heightened scrutiny cases under the Equal Protection Clause."); Johnson Con-
trols 1, 886 F.2d 871, 899 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (comparing the BFOQ analysis to com-
pelling interest test used in First Amendment jurisprudence), rev'd, 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
Under some forms of strict scrutiny, a law must be narrowly drawn to serve a compelling
state interest. See Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). Under medium level scrutiny, a
law need only promote a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effec-
tively absent the regulation. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989);
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982) (holding that under inter-
mediate scrutiny the government must show a substantial relationship between the means
chosen and the important interest served).
28. See W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 413 (1985) (citing Usery v.
Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236 (5th Cir. 1976)); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 333 (1977) (citing Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir.
1969)).
29. See EEOC v. Mississippi, 837 F.2d 1398, 1399 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that "age
qualifications must be more than merely convenient to the employer").
30. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 122 (1985) (discussing an
ADEA claim).
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crimination in favor of or against the trait.31 Although this test sounds
rather stringent, some courts apply it strictly, while others give em-
ployers broad discretion in defining the essential features of a job,
similar to the deference shown in Americans with Disabilities Act 32
("ADA") cases. 33 For example, in Pime v. Loyola University of Chicago,34
the Seventh Circuit determined that being a Jesuit priest was an essen-
tial component of a philosophy professorship at a Jesuit university.3 5
The court justified this requirement even though most of the philoso-
phy professors at the university were not Jesuit 36 (suggesting that be-
ing a Jesuit was not essential), and the core function of the job
(teaching philosophy) did not require ordination to the priesthood. 37
Contrast this case with Frank v. United Airlines, Inc.,38 where the Ninth
Circuit rejected an employer's argument that slenderness is a BFOQ
for female, but not for male, flight attendants. 39 The key to this deci-
sion was the fact that the employer could not show that slenderness
was essential to the job, nor did it even suggest that slenderness aided
flight attendants in performing their assigned tasks. 4° Generally, an
employer cannot show the reasonable necessity of a trait where the
employer does not require all employees to possess the trait.4 1
An employer's good faith or subjective belief that a certain attri-
bute is essential to its business will not satisfy its burden of proving a
BFOQ.42 Further, the fact that state law, or a testator, 43 requires dis-
31. See, e.g., id at 122-23.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
33. See42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
For the purposes of [the ADA], consideration shall be given to the employer's
judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has pre-
pared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the
job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the
job.
Id.
34. 803 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1986).
35. See id at 353-54.
36. See id. at 352.
37. See id. at 353.
38. 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000).
39. See id. at 855.
40. See id.
41. See EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 829 F.2d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 1987).
42. See Carney v. Martin Luther Home, Inc., 824 F.2d 643, 648 (8th Cir. 1987).
43. See EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 466-47 (9th Cir.
1993) (holding that compliance with the discriminatory Protestant-only provision of a last
will and testament does not create a BFOQ).
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crimination does not make the relevant characteristic a BFOQ. 4 4 "The
mere fact that a state enacts a discriminatory regulation does not cre-
ate a BFOQ defense for one who follows such a regulation. ' 45 But a
glance at some of the BFOQ cases in which a state or municipality is a
defendant shows that oftentimes courts will give deference to state leg-
islative findings as to the necessity of an asserted BFOQ.46 When pri-
vate employers are involved, however, the courts typically verify the
necessity of the BFOQ under a stricter objective standard.
Title VII's use of the term "bona fide" indicates that the qualifica-
tion in question must be intimately connected with sex, religion, or
national origin, and the employer must actually use the qualification
in hiring decisions.4 7 The modifier "occupational" indicates that the
asserted BFOQ "must concern job-related skills and aptitudes."48 Mere
peripheral qualifications that make an individual a more desirable
employee generally do not concern the essence of an employer's busi-
ness and thus are not "occupational, ' 49 even though the qualifications
44. See Rosenfeld v. S. Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225-26 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that
compliance with discriminatory state law does not create BFOQ). But see Reed v. County of
Casey, 184 F.3d 597, 599 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that sex was a BFOQ where a female
deputy was reassigned to the undesirable night shift in an effort to comply with a Kentucky
regulation that a female deputy always be on duty when female prisoners were held in the
jail). Actions performed to comply with federal law may get a little more deference from
the courts, especially where Congress or a federal agency has made findings that are
equivalent to those necessary for a BFOQ defense. In Coupev. Federal Express Corp., 121 F.3d
1022 (6th Cir. 1997), the Sixth Circuit held that in asserting a BFOQ defense for age
discrimination, the employer may rely on the factual findings of the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration ("FAA") that age is a suitable proxy for safety, which the agency made in
promulgating its rule against employers using pilots over the age of sixty. See id. at 1026.
"Were it otherwise, Federal Express would be required to second-guess the very agency
established by Congress to regulate it." Id.
45. Garrett v. Okaloosa County, 734 F.2d 621, 624 (11th Cir. 1984).
46. See, e.g., EEOC v. Mo. State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447, 450 (8th Cir. 1984)
("[l]n applying the BFOQ exemption, we should be guided by sound principles of federal-
ism and should accord some deference to the state legislative declaration."); EEOC v. City
of St. Paul, 671 F.2d 1162, 1167 (8th Cir. 1982) (giving no presumption of correctness to
discriminatory employment policies because such a presumption of correctness "would ef-
fectively give the employee the burden of showing that the BFOQ exception does not
apply").
47. See Kopec v. City of Elmhurst, 193 F.3d 894, 901 (7th Cir. 1999).
48. Johnson Controls II, 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991). See also Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738
F.2d 35, 39 (1st Cir. 1984).
49. Thus, as in Weeks v. Southern Bell Tele)hone & Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.
1969), the mere belief that women might find a job more strenuous or difficult than men
would not make sex a BFOQ. See id. at 234.
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might make the business more competitive. 50 Nor will the added ex-
pense to the employer of eliminating discrimination give rise to a
BFOQ defense. 5' However, this is a slight over-generalization. In the
ADEA setting, some federal circuit courts allow employers to justify
discrimination based on factors that do not predict whether the em-
ployees can perform the required tasks, such as the costs involved in
training new employees and in continued employment of older em-
ployees. 52 For these circuits, the financial burden of eliminating dis-
crimination is one factor that courts can consider in the BFOQ
necessity analysis. Other circuits, however, reject this approach, con-
sidering an employer's expense to be an irrelevant factor that greatly
expands the BFOQ defense. 53 Thus, for example, the Seventh Circuit
once held that an employer could not justify an age BFOQ where the
reason for mandatory retirement was "the need to have a definite and
financially feasible age upon which a retirement benefit formula
could be based."5 4 Most courts reason that economic or similar con-
siderations cannot be the basis for a BFOQ because such considera-
tions are among the harms the ADEA and Title VII target. 55
2. Relationship Between the Means and the End
Secondly, the means chosen (i.e., the decision not to hire mem-
bers of a particular class) must be closely related to the essence of the
business. This prong is concerned with the overbreadth of some em-
ployment restrictions. To satisfy this requirement, the employer must
show that all, or substantially all, of the individuals excluded would
have been unable to perform the job safely and effectively, or that it
would have been impracticable to weed out ineffective employees on
50. See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (noting
that Southwest Airlines believed that hiring only female flight attendants would make it
more competitive).
51. See Stephen F. Befort, BFOQ Revisited: Johnson Controls Halts the Expansion of the
Defense to Intentional Sex Discrimination, 52 OHIo ST. L.J. 5, 14 (1991).
52. SeeJohnson v. Am. Airlines, 745 F.2d 988, 991-93 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that in
determining whether age is a BFOQ the employer may look solely to whether age prevents
the employee from performing the job, but may also consider the length of training re-
quired and the ability to recoup its investment); Murnane v. Am. Airlines, 667 F.2d 98,
100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
53. See EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding
that the court cannot consider economic factors as a justification for discrimination);
Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 755 (7th Cir. 1983) (same).
54. Orzel, 697 F.2d at 755.
55. See id.; see also County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d at 1042 (citing Smallwood v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 661 F.2d 303, 307 (4th Cir. 1981)).
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an individual basis. 56 In other words, the employer must show that
possession of the required attribute-whether it is youth, femininity,
masculinity, or French-ness, for example-is either necessary for, or
highly predictive of, successful performance of the job at issue and
that no other non-discriminatory attribute is similarly predictive of
success. Thus, the employment restriction must be more than just rea-
sonable;57 it must be "reasonably necessary" to serve the essence of the
business.58 However, at the other extreme, the need to discriminate
does not have to be absolutely necessary. 59
An employer does not have to demonstrate necessity by objective,
empirical evidence where common sense and expert testimony sup-
port a finding of necessity.60 In showing the necessity of the discrimi-
nation, courts will allow defendants to make reasonable projections as
to the effects of a failure to discriminate. 61 Employers are free to use
expert testimony to demonstrate that there are no reasonable alterna-
tives, even though the employer did not consult an expert when it
crafted its discriminatory employment policies. 62 Furthermore, defen-
56. See W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 414 (1985) (citing Weeks v. S. Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969)). This test is usually used in age discrimi-
nation cases, where the difficulty of determining whether elderly employees remain strong
and healthy could be costly. It may also be applicable in pregnancy discrimination cases,
where it might be difficult to determine which pregnant women could still perform diffi-
cult tasks. See Burwell v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 367, 373 (4th Cir. 1980) (Sprouse,
J., concurring) (holding that an employer established business necessity defense to dispa-
rate impact claim where it showed that it could not easily identify which pregnant flight
attendants would experience abnormal health incidents).
57. If the employer merely had to show that its restrictions on hiring or retention
were reasonable, their burden would be like that of defendants facing rational basis scru-
tiny in Equal Protection Clause cases. See Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121
S. Ct. 955, 963-64 (2001) (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)) ("Under ra-
tional-basis review . . . 'a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if
there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate
governmental purpose."').
States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth
Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a legiti-
mate state interest. The rationality commanded by the Equal Protection Clause
does not require States to match age distinctions and the legitimate interests they
serve with razorlike precision.
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000).
58. See Criswell, 472 U.S. at 419 ("The BFOQ standard adopted in the statute is one of
'reasonable necessity,' not reasonableness.").
59. See Johnson Controls 1, 886 F.2d 871, 903 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J., dissenting)
(stating that the relevant qualification must be "more than just reasonable but less than
absolutely necessary"), rev'd, 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
60. See Healey v. Southwoods Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 1996).
61. See Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 767 (7th Cir. 1999).
62. See Williams v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 806 F.2d 1387, 1390 (9th Cir. 1986).
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dant-employers do not need to conduct formal studies as to the neces-
sity of hiring only members of a particular class, 63 although such
studies certainly strengthen their BFOQ defense.
Some courts preclude an employer from invoking the BFOQ de-
fense if the employer does not apply the qualification consistently. 64
For example, if a French restaurant refuses to hire a Chinese chef
because of his national origin, the restaurant cannot hire a Mexican
cook instead. "For an occupational qualification to be 'bona fide,' it
must be just as valid and necessary one day as it is the next, '65 and it
must be considered a vital trait from one employee to the next.
Although the employer's discriminatory practice does not have to
be the least restrictive means available to serve essential business inter-
ests, 6 6 substantial overbreadth, or over-inclusiveness, will jeopardize a
finding that the discrimination was "reasonably necessary." Courts
look to see if reasonable alternatives to discrimination might equally
serve the relevant business purposes. 67 In particular, in Western Air
Lines, Inc. v. Criswell,68 the United States Supreme Court made clear
the fact that other employers in the industry do not use the BFOQ
strongly suggests that the restriction is not reasonably necessary.69 Ex-
cept as noted above, 70 substantial financial loss associated with failing
to discriminate does not make the relevant trait a BFOQ unless the
63. SeeJennings v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 786 F. Supp. 376, 385 (S.D.N.Y.
1992).
64. See EEOC v. Miss. State Tax Comm'n, 873 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc)
(disc zssing employer's failure to apply standards consistently among current employees as
precluding employer's invocation of a BFOQ based on those standards). For example, if an
employer who does precision work excluded workers over the age of fifty because such
employees usually suffer from farsightedness, but retains many younger employees who
also suffer from the condition, it suggests that perfect vision may not be essential to the
job.
65. Garrett v. Okaloosa County, 734 F.2d 621, 624 (l1th Cir. 1984).
66. See Reed v. County of Casey, 184 F.3d 597, 599 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that an
alternative existed to the employer's decision to transfer a female deputy to the undesir-
able night shift in order to comply with a state law that a female deputy always be present
while female prisoners are in custody at the jail, but that the alternative was expensive and
undesirable); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (holding that
to satisfy intermediate scrutiny in the free speech context, the government need not show
that it used the least restrictive means available).
67. See, e.g., Johnson Controls 1, 886 F.2d 871, 901 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that there
"has been no convincing exposition in the record of any suitable alternative or of scientific,
medical or technical evidence supporting the efficacy of such an alternative"), rev'd, 499
U.S. 187 (1991).
68. 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
69. See id. at 423.
70. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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financial loss would cripple the employer.7' Thus, in Wilson v. South-
west Airlines Co., 72 even though Southwest Airlines predicted that hir-
ing male flight attendants would substantially decrease its bottom-line,
a district court in Texas found that this economic loss was not a suffi-
cient justification for recognizing sex as a BFOQ.73
C. The Justifications Behind BFOQs
Courts have recognized four types of BFOQs based on their as-
serted justifications: (1) those related to the safety of customers and
employees; (2) those related to the performance of necessary tasks;
(3) those affecting the authenticity of the product or service; and (4)
those related to the privacy of patrons.74
1. Safety
"Safety concerns may be factored into the BFOQ calculus if safety
goes 'to the core of the employee's job performance'-that is, when
the safeguarding of human lives is an inherent part of the job. ' 75 For
example, in Dothard v. Rawlinson,76 the United States Supreme Court
found that a maximum-security prison could exclude women from
jobs requiring contact with the prisoners because of the close tie be-
tween sex and the prison guards' ability to maintain a safe and secure
71. See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex 1981). The Fifth
Circuit takes an approach that is slightly more deferential to employers:
Title VII does not purport to shield protected workers from all adverse conse-
quences of non-invidious employment decisions. When an employer has estab-
lished that a standard is justified as a BFOQ or by business necessity, it would be
unreasonable to place on it the burden of taking extraordinary measures to cush-
ion the blow for affected employees. A "less discriminatory alternative," therefore,
is only that which accords with the employer's customary practices so amenably
that the failure to use the alternative indicates that the legitimate concerns sup-
porting the challenged standard are pretextual.
Levin v. Delta Air Lines, 730 F.2d 994, 1001 (5th Cir. 1984).
72. 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
73. See id. at 304.
74. Justice Scalia has also suggested a fifth type of BFOQ. See Johnson Controls 11, 499
U.S. 187, 223-24 (1991) (ScaliaJ., concurring). He opined in his concurrence in Johnson
Controls H that a great expense associated with employing members of one sex could justify
discrimination against that sex based on a BFOQ defense. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia wrote: "I think, for example, that a shipping company may refuse to hire
pregnant women as crew members on long voyages because the on-board facilities for fore-
seeable emergencies, though quite feasible, would be inordinately expensive." Id. at 224
(Scalia, J., concurring).
75. Coup6 v. Fed. Express Corp., 121 F.3d 1022, 1025 (6th Cir. 1997) (quotingJohnson
Controls II, 499 U.S. at 203).
76. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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prison, where safety and security were essential to the prison.77 In
other words, without this BFOQ the safety of prisoners and other
guards would be jeopardized.7 8
The "greater the safety factor, measured by the likelihood of
harm and the probable severity of that harm in a case of an accident,
the more stringent may be the [employer's] job qualifications" de-
signed to prevent such accidents. 79 In other words, the greater the
potential harm that might result from lack of discrimination, the
greater the employer's ability to discriminate to avoid that harm. Still
again, the greater the probability and magnitude of a given danger,
the greater the employer's freedom to exercise its discretion in judg-
ing the reasonableness of safety-related job qualifications.,," Not sur-
prisingly, the "presence of an overriding safety factor might well lead a
court to conclude as a matter of policy that the level of proof required
to establish the reasonable necessity of a BFOQ is relatively low." 1
Therefore, when an employer "establishes that ajob qualification has
been carefully formulated to respond to documented concerns for
public safety, it will not be overly burdensome to persuade a trier of
fact that the qualification is 'reasonably necessary' to safe operation of
the business." 82
The safety rationale most often arises in ADEA cases where em-
ployers impose mandatory retirement on employees (frequently pilots
or police officers) who claim that they are still capable of performing
77. See id. at 335-36.
78. See id Because of the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, even state safety regula-
tions that mandate the sex of prison guards would fall prey to Title VII were it not for the
BFOQ defense. See Reidt v. County of Trempealeau, 975 F.2d 1336, 1339 n.3 (7th Cir.
1992).
79. EEOC v. Boeing Co., 843 F.2d 1213, 1221 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Usery v. Tamiami
Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236 (5th Cir. 1976)).
80. See id.
81. Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co., 675 F.2d 842, 845 (6th Cir. 1982).
82. W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 419 (1985). See also EEOC v. County of
Santa Barbara, 666 F.2d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[E]mployers whose businesses are
safety-related have less difficulty proving that age is a BFOQ."). At one time, the Seventh
Circuit applied only rational basis review to employers whose businesses had an important
safety component, such as industries that carry passengers. See Hodgson v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859, 863 (7th Cir. 1974) ("Greyhound must demonstrate that it has a
rational basis in fact to believe that elimination of its maximum hiring age will increase the
likelihood of risk of harm to its passengers."). The court has since moved away from this
standard to the "reasonably necessary" review mandated by Criswell and the text of Title
VII. See Kopec v. City of Elmhurst, 193 F.3d 894, 902 (7th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. North Knox
Sch. Corp., 154 F.3d 744, 751 n.2 (7th Cir. 1998).
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theirjobs.8 4 Usually, the plaintiffs lose these contests. For example, in
one ADEA safety case, the Supreme Court held that relative youth
(younger than sixty years old) was a BFOQ for flight engineers be-
cause age-related disabilities might prevent the engineers from assist-
ing the pilot, thereby endangering the lives of passengers and crew.8 4
Furthermore, while undoubtedly some pilots under the age of sixty
present safety hazards, and some over the age of sixty do not, the
court held that age is a relatively accurate proxy for safety, and there
are no appropriate, less restrictive means under the circumstances.8 5
Importantly, however, employers have based the BFOQ defense
in these situations on the lack of technology to ascertain which elderly
employees pose a safety threat,8 6 such as a medical device that would
predict with accuracy when an elderly pilot is likely to suffer a heart
attack or stroke. This has led courts to recognize that "a once valid
BFOQ may lose its justification with advances in medical science. That
the age 60 rule may have been a BFOQ in 1978 does not place it
beyond challenge now."8 7 Advancing technology may also destroy the
relevance of other safety BFOQs if implementation of new safety de-
vices or protective measures can prevent the feared mishaps.
Some employers also seek to justify discriminatory hiring policies
on the grounds of safety to third parties, sometimes unborn third par-
ties. The Supreme Court confronted one such case in International
Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc.88 There, the Court rejected an em-
ployer's paternalistic policy of refusing employment to fertile women
for certain positions in which they would be exposed to lead, a known
cause of birth defects. 8 9 The Court held that the employer could not
assert infertility as an essential qualification of the job to justify its
83. See, e.g., Criswell, 472 U.S. at 2744-45; Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738 F.2d 35 (1st Cir.
1984).
84. See Criswell, 472 U.S. at 419. Contrast Criswell with Diaz v. Pan American World Air-
ways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), where the Fifth Circuit held that the exclusion of
males from flight attendant positions was not necessary to preserve the essence of the em-
ployer's business. See Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388. While female flight attendants might make
customers happier, and thus might increase the probability that a passenger will fly with
Pan Am in the future, the sex of the flight attendant made no difference in the perform-
ance of the flight attendant's duties. See id. at 389.
85. See Coup6 v. Fed. Express Corp., 121 F.3d 1022, 1026 (6th Cir. 1997).
86. See Monroe v. United Air Lines, Inc., 736 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1984).
87. Id.
88. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
89. See id. at 206-07. Although the policy appeared paternalistic, Justice White's con-
currence recognized that the employer has a legitimate desire to avoid tort liability for any
harm to unborn children and that its practices might be a manifestation of this desire. See
id. at 212-13 (White, J., concurring).
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practice, as the safety of any potential fetus was not. 'essential" to the
employer's business and could not be the basis for a BFOQ.90 After
Johnson Controls, it is highly unlikely that an employer can ever justify
discriminatory hiring based on paternalistic notions of what is best for
the employee's safety, unless the safety of the employee also affects
the safety of customers or co-workers, not family.91 The view endorsed
by Johnson Controls is that "personal risk decisions not affecting busi-
ness operations are best left to individuals who are the targets of dis-
crimination. '92 Johnson Controls, therefore, calls into question the
reasoning of Kern v. Dynalectron Corp.,93 where the Northern District
Court of Texas held that being a Moslem was a BFOQ for certain pilot
-positions in Saudi Arabia.94 Under Saudi law, any non-Moslem found
in Mecca would be executed.95 Assuming that the employee's refusal
to comply with the Saudi exclusionary law would harm only the em-
ployee-he would be decapitated-the Kern holding prevents such
employees from deciding for themselves whether to bear the risk of
their conduct.96 In so holding, the court apparently reasoned that em-
ployers could discriminate when necessary to protect potential em-
ployees from serious harm, 97 reasoning which the Supreme Court
rejected in Johnson Controls.
90. See id. at 206.
We conclude that the language of both the BFOQ provision and the PDA which
amended it, as well as the legislative history and the case law, prohibit an em-
ployer from discriminating against a woman because of her capacity to become
pregnant unless her reproductive potential prevents her from performing the du-
ties of her job.
91. See Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1425 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (Rafeedie, J.,
concurring) ("[R]isk to the plaintiff is not sufficient to establish either a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification or the business necessity defense.").
92. Burwell v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 371 (4th Cir. 1980) (Sprouse, J.,
concurring).
93. 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
94. See id. at 1201.
95. See id at 1198. Today, because of the amendments-to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, the employer's discriminatory hiring policies would probably have passed mus-
ter under the "compliance with foreign law" exception. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (b) (1994)
(allowing discrimination in a foreign country if done to comply with foreign law).
96. Of course, it is possible that the court was considering the fact that a decapitated
employee would leave passengers stranded in Mecca, thereby seriously harming the em-
ployer's business.
97. See Kern, 577 F. Supp. at 1200.
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2. Privacy and the Rehabilitation of Prisoners
Although the Supreme Court has not encountered a BFOQ de-
fense based on privacy, the lower federal courts "have consistently rec-
ognized that privacy interests may justify sex-based requirements for
certain jobs."98 In recognition of the fact that many people are more
comfortable if members of the same sex see them unclothed, 99 courts
have accepted a privacy rationale for discrimination based on sex, af-
ter an analysis of whether less intrusive measures were feasible. 1l 0 To
show that the employment practice is narrowly tailored, some courts
require defendants to demonstrate that a simple rearrangement of
job responsibilities would be insufficient to protect the privacy inter-
ests of patrons.""
One court that accepted sex as a BFOQ permitted a hospital to
discriminate against male nurses who wanted to serve in the obstetrics
and gynecology unit.10 2 Several courts have held that psychiatric hos-
pitals may discriminate on the basis of sex through requirements that
one staff member of each sex be available to patients in order to pro-
tect the patients' privacy. 1'4 However, at least one court has ques-
tioned the privacy rationale, asking: "Is it significant that preferences
for privacy from members of the opposite sex may be entirely cultur-
ally created, and that by recognizing such preferences the courts may
98. Johnson Controls II, 499 U.S. 187, 219 n.8 (White, J., concurring).
99. Of course, it is arguable that this feeling of discomfort is a product of a culture
that is entitled to no greater protection than the discomfort that members of one race or
ethnic group might feel around members of another race or ethnic group.
100. See Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1415-16 (N.D. 111. 1984)
("When privacy considerations of clients or guests serve as a reason for hiring only mem-
bers of one sex ... the defendant must also prove that no reasonable alternatives exist to
its gender-based hiring policy.").
101. See, e.g., United States v. Gregory, 818 F.2d 1114, 1118 (4th Cir. 1987) ("The bur-
den of proof is on the employer-defendant to establish a BFOQ and it appears that the
defendant below offered no evidence demonstrating why it could not accommodate,
through the reasonable modification of the facility and job functions, female corrections
officers.").
102. SeeBackusv. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated on other
grounds, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982). The legislative history of Title VII indicates that
members of Congress felt that the desire of elderly women to be treated only by women
nurses was a legitimate one, regardless of privacy concerns, and that the BFOQ provision
would help ensure that the fulfillment of this desire would not result in liability under Title
VII. See 110 CONG. REc. 2718 (1964) (statement of Rep. Goodell).
103. See Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1996); Jen-
nings v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 977 F.2d 731, 732 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
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encourage sex differences at the expense of equality in employ
ment?" 0 4 For most courts, the answer seems to be "no."
As another court has stated, "[I] t is clearly forbidden by Title VII,
to refuse on racial grounds to hire someone because your custo-
mers or clientele do not like his race." 10 5 Yet, courts have recognized
a privacy-based sex BFOQ based on customer preference when
female customers object to men touching them or seeing them
naked."", In Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc.,'0 7 a federal dis-
trict court ruled that in a senior citizen home, being a woman is
a BFOQ for an orderly because the resident women would not con-
sent to male workers bathing them or being subject to other inti-
mate personal contact with male workers."' 8 This practice, so the
court thought, required the employer to hire only women for
such positions, despite the fact that men could perform the essen-
tial functions of the job as well as women. 1°9 Similarly, using the
rationale of privacy-based customer preference, courts allow em-
ployers to hire only male janitors in male bathhouses," 0 female
104. Torres v. Wis. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 838 F.2d 944, 950 (7th Cir. 1988),
vacated upon rehearing en banc, 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988). The Fifth Circuit has sug-
gested that "Congress intended that customer preference might be considered when apply-
ing the BFOQ exception." Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 298 (N.D.
Tex. 1981).
105. Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1982).
106. See Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), affd,
591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979). Cf Jill Gaulding, Against Common Sense: Why Title VII Should
Protect Speakers of Black English, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 637, 693 (1998) ("[E]mployers
pleading a BFOQ defense may not rely on customer or client preferences."). Obviously, a
woman's interest in privacy is greater than a man's interest in being served by only female
flight attendants. The point here is simply to note that while one is permitted and the
other is not, both interests are based on customer preference, and not on the ability of
men or women to perform the actual tasks of the jobs.
107. 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), affd, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979).
108. See id. at 1354. Perhaps because of the lower expectation of privacy in prisons,
neither male nor female prisoners have fared as well as female nursing home residents
when they complained about guards of the opposite sex viewing them in revealing sleep-
wear or various states of undress. See Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 187 (7th Cir. 1994)
("The cases therefore hold that sex is not a bona fide occupational qualification prevent-
ing women from working in all-male prisons and that pat-down searches and occasional or
inadvertent sighting by female prison employees of inmates in their cells or open showers
do not violate the inmates' right to privacy."); Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1217 (2d Cir.
1980). But seeJeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1230 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that in the
BFOQ analysis courts have not used "a more deferential standard than the normal Title VII
analysis merely because the employer was a prison").
109. See Fesel, 447 F. Supp. at 1351.
110. See Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1416-17 (N.D. Ill. 1984)
(holding that sex is a BFOQ for washroom attendants); Brooks v. ACF Indus., Inc., 537 F.
Supp. 1122, 1133 (S.D. W. Va. 1982).
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nurses, "1  male treatment assistants,' 12 male hospital orderlies, l" 3 and
female prison guards, 114 even though members of the excluded sex
are just as capable of performing the essential duties of the particular
jobs. The courts that have permitted the privacy-based sex BFOQ be-
lieve that the very sex of the excluded individuals prevents them from
giving customers adequate privacy. Accordingly, the test for the pri-
vacy-based sex BFOQ is whether the excluded applicants can satisfac-
torily respect the privacy of customers in the performance of the
job.115
Although all BFOQs can be characterized as a capitulation to cus-
tomer preference, 1 6 these privacy-based BFOQs present the prime
example of this form of discrimination. The privacy rationale is even
more remarkable, considering that in most instances courts design it
to protect the sensibilities and preferences only of women. 1 7 Yet,
courts frequently reject customer preference rationales for employers
who hire only male executives," 8 waiters, 19 or bus drivers, 120 or only
females as flight attendants12 1 -especially slender female flight at-
tendants' 22 -or as health club instructors.12 3 These courts reason that
allowing a BFOQ because of customer preference in these cases
111. See Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated
on other grounds, 671 F.2d 1100, 1102-03 (8th Cir. 1982).
112. SeeJennings v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 786 F. Supp. 376 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (per curiam). Interestingly, Jennings added another requirement to the defendant's
burden of proving the applicability of a privacy-based sex BFOQ the patients' privacy inter-
est is entitled to protection under the law. See id. at 383-84, This element might be implicit
in the other elements of the sex BFOQ in other privacy decisions, as protecting a weak
privacy interest hardly seems essential to a defendant's business.
113. SeeJones v. Hinds Gen. Hosp., 666 F. Supp. 933, 936-37 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
114. See Robino v. Iranon, 145 F.3d 1109, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 1998).
115. SeeJennings, 786 F. Supp. at 385.
116. See Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525, 535 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that Con-
gress "has indicated that customer preference may be considered under the limited 'bona
fide occupational qualification' exception in the areas of religion, sex, and national ori-
gin"), rev'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
117. See, e.g., Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978),
affd, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979).
118. See Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1981).
119. See Levandos v. Stern Entm't, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 1104, 1107 (W.D. Pa. 1989), rev'd
on other grounds, 909 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1990).
120. See Bollenbach v. Bd. of Educ., 659 F. Supp. 1450, 1453, 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
121. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388-89 (5th Cir. 1971);
Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 304 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
122. See Gerdom v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 608 (9th Cir. 1982).
123. See EEOC v. Sedita, 755 F. Supp. 808, 810-11 (N.D. Ill. 1991); see also Wittmer v.
Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the possibility that race could be a
BFOQ in equal protection cases where prisoners demand guards of their own race).
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"would only serve to perpetuate the very prejudice that Title VII was
meant to overcome."'12 4 Apparently, the courts believe that no such
prejudice is operating in the privacy cases. Furthermore, within the
privacy cases, the courts deem the interests of ordinary customers in
their privacy to be less than those of patients in nursing and health
care facilities. 1 25
Where the privacy of female inmates is considered necessary for
their rehabilitation-particularly where they have been sexually or
physically abused by men-courts will hold that being a woman is a
bona fide qualification for certain prison guard positions. 126 Similarly,
in Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hospital,127 the employer-hospital
based its discrimination against women in making job assignments in
part on privacy concerns and in part on a therapeutic element. 128 The
hospital claimed it had designed the discrimination to ensure that
there were a sufficient number of men on the staff in order to provide
"role models" for the male patients.1 29 This case shows how defend-
ants generally may couple other concerns with the privacy justification
to obtain protection under the BFOQ provision. However, courts have
also limited the use of the BFOQ defense in these situations, lest the
exception swallow the rule; they look to see whether alternatives to
complete discrimination-such as limiting job assignments-could
sufficiently protect the privacy of the inmates. 130 Thus, female institu-
tions cannot completely prohibit men from serving as guards, or vice-
versa. However, as in the nursing home setting, employees may be
restricted from assignments that entail observing undressed inmates
or being alone with an inmate of the opposite sex.' 3 1
A few cases go beyond Healey and hold that prisons can discrimi-
nate against a particular sex even if it is necessary solely for the in-
mates' rehabilitation, regardless of privacy concerns. 132 In Torres v.
Wisconsin Department of Health & Social Services,'3 3 the employer justi-
124. Befort, supra note 51, at 14.
125. Others have tried to reconcile this seeming contradiction by suggesting that cus-
tomer preference may "constitute a BFOQ if it is so extreme as to result in complete impos-
sibility of performance." Id. at 15.
126. See Robino v. Iranon, 145 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1998).
127. 78 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 1996).
128. See id. at 133.
129. See id.
130. See Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1373 (11th Cir. 1982).
131. See Robino, 145 F.3d at 1111.
132. See Torres v. Wis. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1532 (7th Cir.
1988) (en banc).
133. 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
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fied the exclusion of male guards from a prison for women because of
a perceived need to limit contact between female prisoners and male
authority. 134 The employer based the exclusion of men on a belief
that it would aid prisoners in their rehabilitation. 35 The court had no
trouble with the prison's assertion that rehabilitation is a goal within
the essence of a prison's function.1 3" The real problem came with the
tailoring of the means employed to serve this end, as the prison
presented no evidence that excluding males from guard positions
would actually benefit the inmates. 13_7 However, the court did not ap-
pear overly concerned with this omission, since at the time no studies
on the subject existed, making it more difficult for the defendant to
prove its case.' 38 Because the policy was a good attempt at rehabilita-
tion, the court believed that prison officials were entitled to experi-
ment with this penological technique. 3 9
[T]heirjudgments ... are entitled to substantial weight when they
are the product of a reasoned decision-making process, based on
available information and experience. The fact that the program is
considered a reasonable approach by other professional penolo-
gists also is a factor to be given significant consideration. In an area
where the questions are so many and the answers so few, the range
of reasonable options must necessarily be more extensive. Cer-
tainly, the court ought not require unanimity of opinion and ought
not to substitute completely its own judgment for that of the
administration. 140
However, this deference should not fool other employers into believ-
ing that they too will receive this type of light review. Courts only grant
prison officials this broad discretion, and three of the eleven judges of
the en banc court believed too much deference was shown. 41
3. Performance of Actual Occupational Tasks
Employers can also justify discrimination when the ability to phys-
ically perform the essential tasks of the job is tied to sex, religion, or
national origin. For example, although discrimination against preg-
nant women is a form of sex discrimination under the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act, sex is sometimes found to be a BFOQ when pregnant
employees cannot perform all of the essential functions of a given
134. See id. at 1530.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 1531.
138. See id. at 1532.
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 1534 (Cudahy, Cummings & Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
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job.1 4 2 Thus, one employer claimed that sex (or "non-pregnancy") was
a BFOQ because employees had to be able to lift seventy-five pounds,
and most pregnant women were not up to the task.143 However, in
that particular case, the employer nevertheless failed to establish the
BFOQ defense because the lifting requirement was not a truly neces-
sary part of the plaintiff's job, as evidenced by the employer's failure
to enforce the lifting requirement on all employees. 144
In another type of performance case, the Seventh Circuit held
that the ability to speak English was a BFOQ for employees in a terti-
ary care hospital. 145 Therefore, discrimination against Latinos who
could not speak English was not a violation of Title VII.146 The Ninth
Circuit has recognized that employers may justify a fluency require-
ment in the entertainment industry, as the audience must be able to
understand the entertainers on some level." 47 The court opined:
[A] disc jockey may be required to speak English as a condition of
employment and .. .may be required to broadcast exclusively in
that language if the station owner so desires. The ability to speak
the language in which the program is to be broadcast is obviously a
bona fide occupational qualification for any broadcaster. 148
Despite these two instances, use of the performance justification is
rare because sex, religion, and national origin seldom, standing alone,
prevent a person from performing the essential tasks of most
occupations.
4. Authenticity
Courts have also recognized that the authenticity of a product or
service sometimes requires that employees be members of a particular
sex, nationality, or religion. For example, French or Chinese restau-
142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ....
Id.
143. See Deneen v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 431, 436 (8th Cir. 1998).
144. See id. at 437.
145. See Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 660 F.2d 1217, 1222 (7th Cir.
1981). "A 'tertiary care hospital' is a highly specialized medical facility (which provides) ...
sophisticated diagnostic services and treatment which normally can(not) be provided by
secondary and primary care facilities." Id. at 1221.
146. See id.
147. See Gutierrez v. Mun. Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1041 n.13 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as
moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989).
148. Id.
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rants may need to hire only chefs from France or China in an effort to
retain authenticity in the cooking. 149 Similarly, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") guidelines relating to BFOQs rec-
ognize that employers may lawfully discriminate against men in hiring
actresses to play the part of female characters in theatrical produc-
tions.1 50 Religion can also be a BFOQ based on the need for authentic
religious ceremonies. 51 Thus, where a particular church discrimi-
nates against non-adherents in hiring ministers to perform religious
rites, religion can be a BFOQ. 152 Similarly, in churches like the Ro-
man Catholic Church, where ecclesiastical law decrees that only men
may be ordained priests, the sex BFOQ is applicable to protect the
authenticity of the church's ministry.
At the other end of the spectrum, a mere clause in a school sys-
tem's charter that mandates the hiring of teachers belonging to a cer-
tain religion will not make religion a BFOQ presumably based on
fears that this would make it too easy to get around Title VII. Thus,
the Ninth Circuit held that the Kamehameha Schools of Hawaii ille-
gally discriminated against a prospective teacher by refusing to con-
sider her because she was not a Protestant, even though the schools
had adopted a mandate requiring them to hire only members of Prot-
estant religions. 15" Adherence to a Protestant religion was not a BFOQ
because the teaching of religious tenets or values was not an essential
part of the schools' mission, and in fact, the schools did not vigorously
enforce the Protestant-only requirement.1 54 Contrast that case to Pime,
discussed above, 155 where a divided panel of the Seventh Circuit held
that being ajesuit priest was a BFOQ for a teaching position at a nom-
inally Catholic university. 56 It is hard to reconcile these two cases,
149. See Util. Workers v. S. Cal. Edison, 320 F. Supp. 1262, 1265 (C.D. Cal. 1970); 110
CONG. REC. 7213 (1964) (prepared statement of Sen. Clark & Sen. Case).
150. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (2000) ("Where it is necessary for the purpose of
authenticity or genuineness, the Commission will consider sex to be a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification, e.g., an actor or actress.").
151. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1994).
152. Religious institutions are also protected by another provision, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-1 (a) (1994), which states that Title VII does not apply to religious corporations,
associations, or educational institutions "with respect to the employment of individuals of a
particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by" such institutions.
Id. Because of the broader protection provided by this exemption, defendants seldom have
to resort to the religion BFOQ to defend a religious discrimination claim.
153. See EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 465 (9th Cir. 1993).
154. See id. at 462.
155. See discussion supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
156. See Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 803 F.2d 351, 353-54 (7th Cir. 1986).
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particularly because in Pime, the university conceded that non-Jesuits
could teach philosophy just as effectively as Jesuit priests.1 5 7
In any event, defendants rarely use the authenticity justification
in litigation, partly because sex, religion, and national origin are not
usually impediments to performing actual tasks of employment. Nev-
ertheless, as discussed below, 1 5 a an authenticity justification may be
the best justification for directors seeking to discriminate in casting
actors of a particular race, particularly in plays and movies based on
history or which take place in a particular time period and/or
location.
H. Congress' Failure to Enact a Race or Color BFOQ
The instances of controlled discrimination discussed above gen-
erally seem innocuous and are largely uncontroversial. Likewise, it
seems that employers could justify race and color discrimination for
the same reasons, such as authenticity, especially in the world of arts
and entertainment. Discriminating against whites in hiring black ac-
tors to play the parts of black characters would presumably be accept-
able to most reasonable people. 159 Indeed, the EEOC has recognized
that the entertainment industry is one place where discrimination
might be necessary. 1 60 Similarly, seeking only black applicants to work
as investigative reporters in the African-American community might
be necessary in some instances and unobjectionable to most people.
The catch, however, is that race is not an explicitly authorized basis
for discrimination under Title VII, and it is important to understand
why.
157. See id. at 356 (Posner, J., concurring). Judge Posner, concurring in Pime, may have
had the better of the argument:
Pime was turned down for a tenure-track position in Loyola's philosophy depart-
ment not because he is a Jew, not because he is not a Catholic, but because he is
not a member of the Jesuit order. I therefore do not think he has been deprived
of an employment opportunity because of his religion.
Id. (Posner, J., concurring).
158. See discussion infta Parts 11, V.A.2.
159. The United Kingdom, for example, recognizes race as a genuine occupational
qualification where the authenticity of a business requires racial discrimination in hiring.
See Bryan D. Glass, Comment, The British Resistance to Age Discrimination Legislation: Is It Time
to Follow the U.S. Example?, 16 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 491, 505 (1995).
160. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (2) (2000) (stating that a sex BFOQ exists in hiring actors
where it is necessary for authenticity).
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A. The Gravity of Race Discrimination
Numerous courts have opined that Congress intentionally elected
not to include race or color as a basis for a BFOQ defense.' 6 1 "Con-
gress, in its determination to eliminate this form of discrimination,
did not provide for exceptions to race and color discrimination, not
even narrow ones."162 Courts base this opinion primarily on the legis-
lative history of Title VII, which indicates that Congress explicitly con-
sidered and rejected a race BFOQ.163 In particular, the House of
Representatives considered an amendment to the BFOQ provision
that would have included race and color. 6 4 In support of the amend-
ment, Congressmen repeatedly mentioned the need to protect movie
producers who needed to discriminate based on race and skin
color. 165
I commend the gentleman from Mississippi for offering this
amendment. I have in mind a situation where a theatrical group
wants to put on Shakespeare's great tragedy "Othello." They need
a particular type of individual to play the part of Othello. How
could that be accomplished unless the gentleman's amendment is
adopted? How could they possibly get the type of individual to play
that part unless we incorporate the words "race or color" in this
section. 166
Nevertheless, Congress rejected the amendment.
Congress' decision not to include race or color in the BFOQ pro-
vision is partially due to its belief that race discrimination was more
prevalent and harmful than discrimination on the basis of religion,
sex, or national origin. 167 "[A] ntidiscrimination law seeks to exercise a
161. See Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating
the omission of race or color from Title VII's BFOQ provision was "certainly not by an
oversight"); Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525, 535 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
162. RobertJ. Aalberts & Lorne H. Seidman, Should Prudential Standing Requirements Be
Applied in Transferred Impact Sexual Harassment Cases? An Analysis ofChildress v. City of Rich-
mond, 26 PEPP. L. REv. 261, 281 (1999).
163. See 110 CON. REC. 7217 (1964) (prepared statement of Sen. Clark & Sen. Case).
164. See 110 CONG. REC. 2550 (1964) (amendment offered by Rep. Williams).
165. See id. (statement of Rep. Huddleston & Rep. Williams).
166. Id. (statement of Rep. Huddleston).
167. See, e.g., Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v. Fiedler, 922 F.2d 419, 422 (7th Cir.
1991).
The Supreme Court does not consider discrimination against women to be as
invidious-as harmful and as difficult to justify-as discrimination against blacks
or other racial minorities; nor, to come to the point, does it consider discrimina-
tion against men to be as invidious as racial discrimination. In treating sex dis-
crimination less severely than racial discrimination, the Court is following a
distinction in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which establishes a defense
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far more sweeping transformation of race than of gender, as is evident
in the fact that Title VII does not even contain a BFOQ exception for
race." 168 "Title VII, by its own terms, appears to find something partic-
ularly heinous about race discrimination." 169 "Tide VII is a blanket
prohibition of racial discrimination, rational and irrational alike, even
more so than of other forms of discrimination attacked by Title
VII." 170 The Congressmen speaking in opposition to amending the
BFOQ provision to include race or color stated quite plainly that they
feared any such exception would single-handedly negate the anti-dis-
crimination provision of Tide VII, stating:
A grave difficulty arises when we contemplate the substitute
amendment. You must remember that the basic purpose of title VII
is to prohibit discrimination in employment on the basis of race or
color. Now the substitute amendment, I fear would destroy this
principle. It would permit discrimination on the basis of race or
color. It would establish a loophole that could well gut this title.
171
The trouble with the amendment offered by the gentleman from
Mississippi is that it opens it up a good deal more than the case of a
casting director looking for actors to play certain roles in a dra-
matic production. If it was limited to that, it would be a lot more
acceptable than it is. But it opens up other possibilities that I do
not think any of us would want to open.
172
B. The Belief That Tide VII Does Not Cover Benign Race
Discrimination
Another reason that race was not included in the BFOQ provi-
sion was the mistaken belief on the part of some Congressmen that it
was unnecessary.' 73 In particular, some Congressmen thought that Ti-
of bona fide occupational qualification for sex discrimination but denies it for
racial discrimination.
Id. (citations omitted).
168. Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88
CAL. L. REV. 1, 37 (2000).
169. Kenneth L. Schneyer, Hooting: Public and Popular Discourse About Sex Discrimination,
31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 551, 603 (1998). Schneyer continues, "This is important because
it gives the appearance of reducing the importance of sex discrimination: if Congress
would allow BFOQs for sex but not for race, sex discrimination must not be as bad as race
discrimination." Id. But this reasoning fails to take into account the possibility that Con-
gress thought that there were more instances, and probably more important instances
(such as the privacy cases), in which sex discrimination could be justified as opposed to the
few instances where race discrimination is "necessary."
170. Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1982).
171. 110 CONG. REc. 2556 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler).
172. Id. (statement of Rep. O'Hara).
173. See Peterson, supra note 6, at 354.
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tie VII did not prohibit certain forms of benign race discrimination. 174
This assumption appears to be the case especially with respect to the
entertainment industry. For example, members of the Senate ques-
tioned the floor managers as to whether the Harlem Globe Trotters or
movie directors could discriminate based on race.1 75 They responded
that both groups would be exempt from Title VII in the first in-
stance.1 76 The Globe Trotters would be exempt because they presuma-
bly would have too few employees to be covered by Title VII.1 77 The
movie directors would be able to discriminate based on "physical ap-
pearance," as opposed to discriminating based on race, under Title
VII.178 Members of the House held similar beliefs. 179 As Congressman
O'Hara stated: "In the example used, which involved a dramatic per-
formance, some particular role may require a person whose skin is of
a particular hue. I do not think that when you seek such person for
that role, you come within the meaning of the unfair practices de-
scribed in this bill."' 80 Based on these beliefs, Congress exercised its
discretion and excluded a race or color BFOQ from Title VII and has
not found it necessary to subsequently amend the statute to protect
this form of discrimination.
III. The Reasonableness and Utility of a Race or Color
BFOQ
Despite Congress' omission of race' 81 from the BFOQ provision,
people accept the reasonableness and morality of recognizing a
BFOQ for race, at least in some instances involving the entertainment
industry.' 82 Indeed, to demonstrate the necessity of a race BFOQ
some scholars use as their prime example the need to employ black
actors to portray black characters.18 3 As one academician has written:
"[W] e ought to admit the possibility of a BFOQ in the case of race, as
the federal law does not, because there seems nothing harmful, in a
realist production, in requiring that we have actors who look-and






180. Id. at 2556 (statement of Rep. O'Hara).
181. Some Congressmen had a strange notion as to what constitutes "race." "The five
races of man are white, black, brown, yellow, and red. I think it is clear that the American
Indian is a matter of race, not national origin." Id. at 2562 (statement of Rep. Huddleston).
182. See Appiah, supra note 5, at 46-47.
183. See id.
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sound-like people of whatever racial identity they are represent-
ing."18 4 Moreover, even the EEOC-which frequently finds invidious
discrimination wherever it looks-recognizes the need for realistic ac-
tors, at least with respect to sex.185 It has stated that "[w]here it is
necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness, the Commis-
sion will consider sex to be a bona fide occupational qualification,
e.g., an actor or actress." 18 6 Similarly, Justice Stevens-hardly a shrink-
ing violet on racial issues-argued that race must be taken into ac-
count in making some hiring and placement decisions, at least for
governments:
[I]n our present society, race is not always irrelevant to sound gov-
ernmental decisionmaking To take the most obvious example, in
law enforcement, if an undercover agent is needed to infiltrate a
group suspected of ongoing criminal behavior-and if the mem-
bers of the group are all of the same race-it would seem perfectly
rational to employ an agent of that race rather than a member of a
different racial class. Similarly, in a city with a recent history of ra-
cial unrest, the superintendent of police might reasonably con-
clude that an integrated police force could develop a better
relationship with the community and thereby do a more effective
job of maintaining law and order than a force' composed only of
white officers.1 8
7
It can also be argued that race is essential to some positions in
which the employees act as role models for children.18 8 Since it might
be easier for children to identify with someone of their own race and
sex, it might be necessary to hire individuals on these bases in order to
provide children with adequate models after whom they can emulate
and pattern their own behavior. 18 9 This argument may have particular
184. Id.
185. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (2) (2000).
186. Id.
187. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 314 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted). See also Garcia v. City of Houston, 201 F.3d 672, 676 n.3 (5th Cir. 2000)
(discussing how defendant originally attempted to establish a race BFOQ for hiring blacks
based on the need to infiltrate black neighborhoods in undercover operations).
188. See Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding
that discrimination against an unmarried pregnant woman was protected by the BFOQ
provision because staff members were required to be good role models for the children
with whom they worked); see alsoJudy Laurinatis, Charter Schools Seen as Budget Drain, PrITr.
POsT-GAZETrE, Dec. 13, 2000, LEXIS, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette File ("'We have African-
American role models and teachers. We have African-American men as teachers and coun-
selors' .... The value of children having someone with their cultural background teaching
them can't be overstated .... ); Wanted: Minority Teachers, THE HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.),
Sept. 18, 2000, LEXIS, The Herald (Rock City, S.C.) File ("Black teachers bring new cul-
tural dimensions to the classroom and provide adult role models for students.").
189. See Mike Berry, Personality Is Key in School Election, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 29,
2000, LEXIS, Orlando Sentinel File ("[T]he school district needs to attract more black
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force in support of hiring black, male teachers to teach black, male
children, 19° as these children frequently do not have adequate male
role models in their homes. 9 This reasoning obviously extends be-
yond workers who directly deal with children; news and entertainment
personnel can also serve as role models for children and in fact have
access to a larger group of children than does the average teacher,
due the breadth of the entertainment media. In discrete instances,
employers in these industries might perceive a need to discriminate
based on race or color. 192 Consequently, scholars and students of the
male teachers to serve as role models."); Cheryl M. Harris, Schools Seek Black Teachers as Role
Models, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Feb. 12, 2001, LEXIS, Dayton Daily News File ("Students
should not go through 12 years of school seeing only one kind of teacher and role
model .... "); Clark Kauffman, Transracial Adoptions Encounter Opposition, DES MOINES REG.,
Nov. 13, 2000, LEXIS, Des Moines Register File ("The kids need black teachers, black role
models .... ."). As the Court in Wygant noted, "Carried to its logical extreme, the idea that
black students are better off with black teachers could lead to the very system the Court
rejected in Brown v. Board of Education." Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 (citation omitted).
190. Even if there were a race BFOQ for Title VII, however, public school teachers
would have to contend with the plurality holding in Wygant that the need for same-race
role models is not a compelling interest where there has been no showing of a history of
overt discrimination. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 ("Societal discrimination, without more, is
too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy. The role model theory
announced by the District Court and the resultant holding typify this indefiniteness.").
Regardless, even slightly imaginative administrators can (and probably do) get around Wy-
gant in hiring minority teachers. See Lois K. Solomon, Teachers Study New Building Staff Hir-
ing Almost Finished, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), June 15, 2000, LEXIS, Sun-Sentinel
(Fort Lauderdale) File (discussing a school principal's statement that she is "desperately
seeking black teachers for her remaining three openings because one of the school's major
concerns is having role models for its children"). Furthermore, Wygant does not necessarily
preclude discriminatory work assignments, particularly because comparable assignments
do not carry the detriment to other employees that a lay off does. Wygant also does not
extend to private actors, and so if there were a race BFOQ private schools could legally
discriminate in hiring, a practice that may already occur despite Title VII. See Suzanne
Pardington, School Teaches Lesson in Pride, Discipline Black Students Get One-on-One Attention,
SEATrLE TIMES, Sept. 17, 2000, LEXIS, Seattle Times File (discussing how at Malcolm X, a
private school, administrators try "to combat the statistics by giving each student individual
attention" and "hiring black male teachers as role models").
191. See Tamara Henry, Call Them Mister S.C Program Aims to Boost Number of Black Male
Teachers at Elementay Level, USA TODAY, Jan. 30, 2001, at 9D ("Black youngsters, especially
boys, are in desperate need of role models and teachers they can relate to, who can show
them that success and a productive life are possible .... "). Some educators have suggested
that black male children simply need male role models. See Frank Cerabino, Educator Sees
Few Role Models for Black Teens, PALM BEACH POST, June 4, 2000, LEXIS, Palm Beach Post
File (stating that positive male role models are "missing in the lives of too many black boys"
and that these boys "'not only have no males at home; they virtually have no males at
school"'). Accordingly, because Title VII contains a sex BFOQ the contours of this role
model justification will probably be fleshed out through sex discrimination in the hiring of
male teachers, regardless of their race.
192. It could be argued, however, that the guidance of children is not essential to these
industries, and thus is insufficient under the BFOQ standard to warrant discriminatory
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law have suggested that either the legislature orjudiciary create a race
or color BFOQ to reach these cases.1 93 As is demonstrated below, how-
ever, each of these proposals has its pitfalls.1 94
IV. Judicial Creation of a Race or Color BFOQ
One way around Congress' failure to enact a BFOQ for race is for
the judiciary to create such a defense. There are some good argu-
ments for doing so. Among the best is the argument that recognition
of a race BFOQ would be in accordance with one of the purposes of
Title VII: remedying the under-representation of minorities in the
workplaces of America caused by discrimination. 195 Since courts are to
construe statutes to effect their purposes, recognizing a race BFOQ
would protect those employers who discriminate in favor of minori-
ties, perhaps resulting in more minorities on the stage and in film.
Some argue that judicially crafting such a rule is a proper course of
action. 196 Indeed, some scholars suggest that the very necessity of ra-
cial discrimination in the selection of cast members led the Seventh
Circuit to recognize a race BFOQ in Wittmer v. Peters,197 regardless of
Congress' failure to specifically create one.1 98 However, this is just one
side of the story.
A. Contrary to Title VII's Purpose
Even assuming that courts can correctly ascertain a statute's pur-
pose, 199 the belief that a common law extension of a statute is in ac-
cordance with the statute's purpose or is "necessary" does not make it
hiring or assignment. The same might be said with respect to discrimination against teach-
ing applicants or employees.
193. See Peterson, supra note 6, at 355.
194. See discussion infra Part IV.
195. See Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1557 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (stating
that Title VII was designed "to remedy the segregation and under-representation of minor-
ities that discrimination has caused in our Nation's work force").
196. See Gaulding, supra note 106, at 692 n.277.
197. 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996).
198. See Gaulding, supra note 106, at 692 n.277 ("A very narrow judge-made exception
does allow employers to select employees based on race in those few instances where it is
truly necessary (e.g., for an acting job).").
199. See LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 87 (Yale Univ. Press, rev. ed. 1964) ("A
statute, it may be said, does not serve a purpose as simple and as easily defined as, for
example, that of a vacuum cleaner. The social mischief it seeks to remedy is often subtle
and complex, its very existence being perceptible only to those holding certain value
judgments.").
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a legitimate exercise of judicial power.200 As one court states, "Con-
gress had lofty goals [in enacting Title VII] but provided limited
means for reaching those goals."20' Courts that reach beyond the
means provided by Congress risk rewriting Title VII's BFOQ provi-
sion. 202 Furthermore, most courts agree that the failure to include a
race BFOQ provision was an intentional act, 203 and any judicial action
to manufacture one would clearly be contrary to the will of Con-
gress.114 Courts cannot overlook statutory limitations on the chosen
means simply because they serve important purposes, especially where
this would be contrary to the clear intent of Congress. The judicial
creation of a BFOQ defense based on race or color seems to be just
such an act.
B. Misplaced Reliance on Wittmer v. Peters
Despite these concerns, proponents of a race or color BFOQ
could point to Wittmer as an example of a court creating a race
BFOQ.205 Wittmer involved an employer who passed over white prison
guards for a promotion to lieutenant in favor of a black guard who
200. And in this instance, the chosen means is contrary to another purpose of Title VII:
"barring considerations of race from the workplace." Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547,
1558 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc).
201. Hudson v. Soft Sheen Prods., Inc., 873 F. Supp. 132, 136 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (re-
jecting individual liability under Title VII).
202. As one court has noted, "There are a host of... examples ofjudge-made statutory
exceptions so weakly rooted in the statute as to be fairly described as judicial amend-
ments." Crawford v. Ind. Dep't of Corr., 115 F.3d 481, 484 (7th Cir. 1997).
203. See Ray v. Univ. of Ark., 868 F. Supp. 1104, 1126 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
204. Judicial amendment of a statute is justified only in limited circumstances, such as
when Congress provided no rule on a subject before the court, where it is necessary to save
the statute from being struck down as unconstitutional, where Congress essentially author-
ized courts to legislate on an issue, or where the statute would otherwise create an absurd-
ity. As the Seventh Circuit stated:
[C]ourts do not create exceptions to statutes every time it seems that the legisla-
ture overlooked something. The legislative role of the courts is more confined
than that of the legislature. The judges will create a statutory exception only
when, as in the union-shop cases, it is necessary to save the statute from being
held unconstitutional, or when they have great confidence that the legislature
could not have meant what it seemed to say .... The first criterion is really in-
cluded in the second; the legislature presumably would not have wanted the stat-
ute struck down in its entirety.
Crawford, 115 F.3d at 484-85 (citations omitted). When the text of a statute "is unyielding
and beyond rehabilitation, . . . courts are left with no choice but to construct a rule that
makes the best sense, while adhering as closely as possible to what we can discern Congress
would have wanted." Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctrs., 213 F.3d 209, 220-21 (5th
Cir. 2000) (Jones & Smith, JJ., dissenting), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 382 (2000).
205. See Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 917 (7th Cir. 1996).
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scored well below the white guards in an occupational test.2°16 The de-
fendants argued that the discriminatory promotion was necessary for
the success of the new "boot camp" type of prison because "black in-
mates are believed unlikely to play the correctional game of brutal
drill sergeant and brutalized recruit unless there are some blacks in
authority in the camp."20 7 The defendants backed up their claim of
penological necessity with unrebutted expert evidence.208 Despite the
fact that this was essentially a capitulation to the racial prejudices of
inmates, 20 9 this evidence led Judge Posner and his colleagues essen-
tially to hold that race can be a BFOQ in equal protection cases con-
cerning the promotion of prison personnel. 210
1. Equal Protection Clause Versus Title VII
However, employers who look to Wittmer as support for a judi-
cially created BFOQ for race should remember that Wittmer is an
equal protection case, not a Title VII decision. Courts have recognized
that race discrimination that satisfies equal protection standards will
not necessarily withstand scrutiny under Title VII.2 11 Judge Posner was
writing on a clean slate in Wittmer. No such tabula rasa exists for Title
VII, as the legislative history clearly indicates that Congress rejected a
race BFOQ.
2. Rules of Statutory Construction
Beyond any resort to legislative history and its usual perils,212 a
court could simply apply the maxim of statutory construction "expressio
unius exclusio alterius" (the inclusion of one implies the exclusion of
206. See id.
207. 1I at 920.
208. See id at 917.
209. The Seventh Circuit apparently did not see its holding as an abandonment of the
principle that customer preference is not a basis for discrimination, as it promptly re-
peated that very rule. See id. at 920 ("Nor do we hold or believe that prison authorities are
entitled to yield to extortionate demands from prisoners for guards of their own race.").
210. See id. at 921.
211. See Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1560 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc).
212. AsJustice RobertJackson wrote:
[I]t is only the words of the bill that have presidential approval, where that ap-
proval is given. It is not to be supposed that, in signing a bill, the President en-
dorses the whole Congressional Record. For us to undertake to reconstruct an
enactment from legislative history is merely to involve the Court in political con-
troversies which are quite proper in the enactment of a bill but should have no
place in its interpretation.
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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another).213 The fact that Title VII specifically provides for BFOQs
based on sex, religion, and national origin, but not race or color, gives
rise to the presumption that this defense does not extend to discrimi-
nation based on race or color. It is true that courts have disparaged
the maxim as of late,214 but there is little reason to believe that the
failure to include race or color in the BFOQ provision was anything
other than intentional. Furthermore, another rule of statutory con-
struction states that courts must construe exemptions from remedial
statutes narrowly.2 15 Because the BFOQ provision is an exception to a
remedial statute (Title VII), the Supreme Court has made clear that
courts must interpret the BFOQ provision narrowly, lest the exception
swallow the rule. 2 16 Expanding the defense to race or color is hardly
in keeping with a narrow construction of Title VII's BFOQ provision.
3. Judicial Deference to State Employers
Wittmer provides even less support for a Title VII race BFOQ
when one considers that Wittmer is a special kind of discrimination
case. Wittmer was a decision involving a state employer and prison per-
sonnel, not the average employer or employment setting.217 In recog-
nition of federalist concerns, 2 II courts will often allow state employers
some discretion in their employment decisions when invidious dis-
crimination is not readily apparent,2 19 which may partially explain the
Wittmer decision. In recognition of the difficulty of governing prisons,
courts consistently give the states greater freedom in making employ-
213. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MArrER OF INTERPRETATION 25 (1997) ("If you see a sign
that says children under twelve may enter free, you should have no need to ask whether
your thirteen-year-old must pay. The inclusion of the one class is an implicit exclusion of
the other.").
214. See Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 501-02 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting).
While often a valuable servant, the maxim that the inclusion of something nega-
tively implies the exclusion of everything else (expressio unius, etc.) is a dangerous
master to follow in the construction of statutes. It rests on the assumption that all
omissions in legislative drafting are deliberate, an assumption we know to be false.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation and internal quotations omitted). See also Cheney R.R.
Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 902 F.2d 66, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("Scholars have
long savaged the expressio canon.").
215. See EEOC v. City of Janesville, 630 F.2d 1254, 1258 (7th Cir. 1980).
216. See Johnson Controls II, 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991); W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472
U.S. 400, 412 (1985).
217. See Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 917 (7th Cir. 1996).
218. See EEOC v. Mo. State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447, 450 (8th Cir. 1984).
219. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (holding that a
mandatory retirement age for police officers does not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
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ment decisions related to novel prison techniques. 220 Wittmer may be
another manifestation of the deference shown by the Seventh Circuit
in Tonres, discussed above,22 1 where the court accepted Illinois's asser-
tion that being female was a BFOQ because limiting prisoner contact
with males was necessary for their rehabilitation.2 22 Since these same
principles and concerns are not usually present in most other employ-
ment settings, there is little basis to believe that courts will show the
same deference to non-governmental employers who assert race as a
BFOQ. With this in mind, it would be ill-advised to look to the courts
to create a race BFOQ for the entertainment or any other industry.
C. Rejection of the Judicially Created Race BFOQ
At least one district court has rejected the possibility of a judi-
cially created race BFOQ. In Ray v. University of Arkansas,223 many of
the black students and university administrators complained about a
white police officer, Ray, at a predominantly black university.224 Ray's
superiors claimed that his race diminished his effectiveness as an of-
ficer and supported this assertion with evidence that some African-
American students shot at the plaintiff while others hurled racial epi-
thets and vulgarities at him.225 The black chief of police viewed the
plaintiff's race negatively and believed that any "white officer would
be perceived negatively by a portion of his constituent community
which, in turn, could lead to racial responses and confrontations. '" 226
The university, therefore, discharged Ray and justified his termination
with the assertion that being an African-American was a BFOQ for his
position.227 The court admitted that in some instances a race BFOQ
might be rational.228 However, the court also recognized that Con-
gress had tied its hands as to allowing this exception; Congress had
clearly declined to extend the BFOQ provision to race. 22 9 It is proba-
bly safe to assume that most other courts will follow Ray and reject a
race BFOQ for Title VII, thus leaving Congress as the last resort for
220. See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing Torres v. Wis. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 859
F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc)).
221. See supra Part I.C.2.
222. See Torres, 859 F.2d at 1532.
223. 868 F. Supp. 1104 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
224. See id. at 1106.
225. See id. at 1107, 1109.
226. Id. at 1126.
227. See id. at 1126-27. The case does not specifically state that the university argued
for a race BFOQ but the court addressed the argument. See id.
228. See id. at 1126.
229. See id.
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providing protection from Title VII for benign (and sometimes not so
benign) race and color discrimination.
V. Congressional Enactment of a Race or Color BFOQ
Some commentators have recognized the problems with a judi-
cially created race BFOQ and have called instead for Congress to
amend Title VII's BFOQ provision to include race or color.230 How-
ever, due to the dearth of cases dealing with the issue and little anec-
dotal evidence that there is a pressing need for such a BFOQ one
must first ask whether such legislative action is truly necessary.
A. Is Legislative Action Warranted?
Because necessity is frequently the mother of legislation, one
must ask whether amending Title VII's BFOQ provision to include
race or color is necessary for the entertainment industry, or for that
matter, any industry. As mentioned above, it is uncontroverted that in
casting actors for particular parts, directors sometimes intentionally
discriminate based on race. 23' Discriminatory practices may also exist
in the television news industry, where it sometimes may be necessary
to use reporters of a particular race to do undercover work, such as an
expos6 on the Ku Klux Klan, or where an Asian-American reporter
might have better success getting other Asians to volunteer informa-
tion during an interview. 232 These are but two obvious examples of a
form of discrimination that is probably quite common; so common
that many people might not even think of these practices as "discrimi-
nation." These employers, therefore, continue on without questioning
their practices, perhaps believing that Title VII does not speak to their
actions. The initial question is whether these employers are right: Is
this conduct permissible under Title VII?
1. Implicit Exemption to Title VII
Senators Clark and Case, the floor managers of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, took the position that Title VII permits some of these
230. See Appiah, supra note 5, at 47; see also Peterson, supra note 6, at 355; Jennifer L.
Sheppard, Theatrical Casting-Discrimination or Artistic Freedom?, 15 COLUM.-VIAJ.L. & A.TS
267, 276-79 (1991).
231. See Bonnie Chen, Note, Mixing Law and Art: The Role of Anti-Discrimination Law and
Color-Blind Casting in Broadway Theater, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 515, 523-24 (1999).
232. See Miller v. Tex. State Bd. of Barber Exam'rs, 615 F.2d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 1980)
(discussing the need for discriminatory hiring where infiltration of a criminal enterprise of
a particular race is required); Baker v. City of St. Petersburg, 400 F.2d 294, 301 n.10 (5th
Cir. 1968) (same).
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discriminatory practices. 23 3 Surprisingly, they opined that selecting
cast members because they "look" black, as opposed to selecting them
because they are black, is in accordance with the spirit and text of the
law. 234 In answering a question about whether a "movie company mak-
ing an extravaganza on Africa [that] may well decide to have hun-
dreds of extras of a particular race or color to make the movie as
authentic as possible" would violate Title VII, 23 5 the Senators re-
sponded that such discrimination based on racial appearance was
permissible:
Although there is no exemption in title VII for occupations in
which race might be deemed a bona fide job qualification, a direc-
tor of a play or movie who wished to cast an actor in the role of a
Negro, could specify that he wished to hire someone with the phys-
ical appearance of a Negro-but such a person might actually be a
non-Negro. Therefore, the act would not limit the director's free-
dom of choice. 2 3 6
Of course, "[ilsolated statements of individual legislators re-
present neither the intent of the legislature as a whole nor definitive
interpretations of the language enacted by Congress." 23 7 The Sena-
tors' statement is far from definitive, as the EEOC takes a position that
is directly contrary to the one expressed in this excerpt. 238 In short,
the rationale expressed in the excerpt is inconsistent with the contem-
porary interpretation of Title VII. The EEOC has enacted a regulation
stating that the sex BFOQ provision protects the discriminatory hiring
of actors based on their sex,2 39 but it has not promulgated a similar
rule as to skin color or racial appearance, despite the Senators'
assertion.
If as the Senators assert, under Title VII a director is already free
to discriminate on the basis of whether an actor looks like a woman or
a man (or a black man), then there would be no need for the sex
BFOQ in such an instance. In other words, if Title VII already permits
appearance discrimination without the BFOQ provision, there is no
need for an EEOC regulation interpreting the BFOQ provision to per-
mit discrimination based on sexual appearance. Additionally, contrary
to the import of the Senators' remarks, the Supreme Court made




237. In re Davis, 170 F.3d 475, 480 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 822
(1999).
238. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (2) (2000).
239. See id.
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clear in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkin 2 40 that discrimination against a wo-
man because she acts masculine, or does not look or act in a stere-
otypically feminine fashion, is a basis for liability under Title VII.241
Along this line of reasoning, discriminating against an Asian Ameri-
can because he does not sufficiently look or act white, black, or Asian
would also violate Title VII, as the discrimination allows an employer
to ascribe certain looks and behaviors to particular groups and award
employment according to these prejudicial notions. Moreover, Title
VII also prohibits discrimination based on "color."242 Even if a direc-
tor's plea that he was only discriminating based on the color of the
actor's skin frees him from penalties for race discrimination, he has
just admitted to discriminating based on color.
As it is, however, courts agree that Congress made an intentional
decision not to include race or color in the BFOQ provision. 243 In-
deed, the use of race as a job qualification is just the sort of practice
that the Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 was intended to pre-
vent. 244 The legislative record demonstrates that Congress specifically
desired to eliminate the possibility that employers would use race as a
job qualification, although the legislative history also shows that Con-
gress might not have appreciated the full extent to which it was out-
lawing the practice. 245 However, "[i]f Congress intended [to allow
employers to consider] race.., for such purposes as promoting diver-
sity, providing role models, or assuring racial representation on police
forces, Congress could have created a 'bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation' exception for race, such as was done for sex." 246 In fact, Repre-
sentative Williams proposed one.247 The amendment would have
allowed "limited discrimination and classification based on race or
color where such distinctions are genuinely job related."24 "By omit-
ting race from the enumerated 'bona fide occupational qualifica-
240. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
241. See id. at 235, 244-45.
242. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
243. SeeKnight v. Nassau County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 649 F.2d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 1981);
Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525, 535 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 456
U.S. 273 (1982).
244. See 110 CONG. REC. 2556 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler) ("[Tihe basic purpose
of title VII is to prohibit discrimination in employment on the basis of race or color.").
245. See id. (statement of Rep. O'Hara) ("I do not think that when you seek [people
with a particular skin color] for that role, you come within the meaning of the unfair
practices described in this bill.").
246. Robert D. Alt, Toward Equal Protection: A Review of Affirmative Action, 36 WASHBURN
L.J. 179, 192-93 (1997).
247. See 110 CONG. Rrc. 2550 (1964) (amendment offered by Rep. Williams).
248. Alt, supra note 246, at 193.
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tions,' Congress made it clear that" there was to be no exception for
race or color, unlike gender, religion, and national origin. 249
Furthermore, even if, as Senators Case and Clark suggest, 250 Title
VII was not designed to reach bona fide "racial phenotype discrimina-
tion,"25 1 in most situations it would be nearly impossible to differenti-
ate between race discrimination and racial phenotype discrimination
without clear evidence of the employer's intent. Judges and juries are
not particularly adept at mind reading, and discriminators are suffi-
ciently cognizant of the penalties for discrimination that they do not
usually leave direct evidence of their discriminatory intent.2 5 2 In as-
sessing an employer's intent, courts are usually left with indirect evi-
dence of motivation. With this in mind, imagine a court confronted
with a defendant who claimed, "I did not discriminate against the
plaintiff because he is black; I discriminated because he looks black." It
would be difficult for the court to determine whether the employer's
statement was true, or whether race discrimination was masquerading
as racial phenotype discrimination. One's racial phenotype is so
closely related to his or her race that, for most purposes, the two are
indistinguishable.
Because an individual's race and racial phenotype are products of
his or her genetics, discriminating on the basis of whether someone
"looks black" is not much different than discriminating because the
individual is black. Therefore, it is unlikely that mostjuries would per-
ceive any meaningful distinction between the two. Furthermore, it is
important to remember that the plaintiff does not have the burden of
proving that race was the sole cause of the discrimination. 253 Rather,
249. Id.
250. See 110 CONG. REC. 7217 (1964) (prepared statement of Sen. Clark & Sen. Case).
251. "Phenotype" is an individual's observable physical attributes, such as height, eye,
hair, and skin color, facial features, and hair texture; or, as defined by a medical dictionary,
"phenotype" is "the entire physical, biochemical, and physiological makeup of an individ-
ual as determined both genetically and environmentally, as opposed to genotype." DOR-
LAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICrIONARY 1277 (28th ed. 1994).
252. See Radue v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 616 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations
omitted) ("Direct evidence essentially requires an admission by the decision-maker that his
actions were based on the prohibited animus .... [M]ost employers are careful not to
openly discriminate and certainly not to publicly admit it."). The Supreme Court has aptly
described direct evidence of discrimination as "eyewitness testimony as to the employer's
mental processes." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2105 (2000)
(quoting United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)).
253. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994); Fields v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Retarda-
tion & Dev. Disabilities, 115 F.3d 116,120 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that "a Title VII plaintiff
can prevail by proving that an impermissible factor was a 'motivating factor"').
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plaintiffs need only show that race was a motivating factor. 25 4 That is,
plaintiffs need only demonstrate that race was one substantial factor
in the employment decision.255 Even if the defendant claims that an
employer based its employment decision on preferences for a racial
phenotype, a jury could still find that race or color was a motivating
factor.256 In any event, at least one federal circuit has stated that it will
not be fooled by a defendant's claims of phenotypic preference. 257 In
addressing a suggestion on how a movie producer could assert a busi-
ness necessity defense to a disparate impact claim similar to the one
suggested by Senators Clark and Case above, the Fifth Circuit stated:
"It is unlikely that we would either require or be deceived by such
convoluted semantical gymnastics .... ",258 Based on this language,
defendants are well-advised to ignore the Senators' proposed defense.
2. Return to the Judicially Created BFOQ
However, the mere fact that Title VII reaches discriminatory hir-
ing that is "necessary" for accurate depiction of historical events does
not mean that the legislature necessarily needs to enact a BFOQ. As in
other areas of law, Congress oftentimes leaves it to the courts to fill in
the interstices of legislative enactments, and Title VII has been no ex-
ception. For example, the courts have created the "mixed-motive" and
after-acquired evidence defenses in Title VII cases.259 At first blush, it
is not outlandish to think they could also create a race BFOQ defense.
254. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) ("[An unlawful employment practice is established
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also moti-
vated the practice.").
255. See id.; Foster v. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., 168 F.3d 1029, 1033-34 (7th Cir. 1998).
To be a motivating factor.... the forbidden criterion must be a significant reason
for the employer's action. It must make such a difference in the outcome of
events that it can fairly be characterized as the catalyst which prompted the em-
ployer to take the adverse employment action, and a factor without which the
employer would not have acted.
Id.
256. Of course, skin color is one element of a person's phenotype. See DORLAND'S It.-
LUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1277 (28th ed. 1994).
257. See Miller v. Tex. State Bd. of Barber Exam'rs, 615 F.2d 650, 654 (5th Cir. 1980).
258. Id.
259. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (holding
that after-acquired evidence of the employee's misconduct may limit damages); Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) (recognizing a mixed-motives defense);
Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 580 (1st Cir. 1999) ("Mixed-motive
analysis applies when the evidence shows that an employer considered both a proscribed
factor . . .and one or more legitimate factors . . . in making a challenged employment
decision.").
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Proponents of such an idea point to Wittmer, the case in which the
Seventh Circuit recognized a race BFOQ in the "boot camp" prison
setting where maximizing prisoners rehabilitative potential "requires"
racial discrimination. 260 It is also conceivable that a safety justification
might support a race BFOQ where cooperation with authorities dur-
ing fires, riots, and natural disasters might be more forthcoming de-
pending upon the race of the government official. 261 In the news
industry, safety might also justify the assignment of reporters and cam-
era personnel to particular stories. Thus, a television station could jus-
tify not assigning a black reporter to cover a Ku Klux Klan rally, 262 or
refusing to assign a white reporter to a story on African-American
gangs, on safety grounds.263 The assumption is that black gang mem-
bers might be reluctant to open up to white reporters and that most
Klan members would not readily agree to interviews with black report-
ers. Beyond a safety rationale, discriminatory job assignments might
be functionally necessary for the news media.
In the entertainment industry, a compelling justification for a
race BFOQ is authenticity. Authenticity is a legitimate justification for
sex, religion, and national origin BFOQs. 264 If an Italian restaurant
may discriminate against non-Italian chefs without incurring the wrath
of Title VII, it stands to reason that Title VII would exclude a direc-
tor's decision to use black actors to portray Frederick Douglass or Mal-
colm X. The race of actors lends just as much, if not more,
authenticity to a visual production as an Italian chef does to Italian
food. It is doubtful whether restaurant patrons can tell from the qual-
ity of food produced who produced it, while theatergoers can readily
ascertain the color and race of actors in most instances. Employers use
these authenticity rationales to justify national origin and sex
260. SeeWittmerv. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 921 (7th Cir. 1996); see also discussion supra Part
IV.B.
261. See McNamara v. City of Chicago, 138 F.3d 1219, 1222 (7th Cir. 1998) (question-
ing whether race could justify discriminatory hiring of firefighters "who may lack credibil-
ity, and be denied cooperation, in minority neighborhoods if the firehouses in those
neighborhoods have only white personnel").
262. However, this is a form of paternalism that Title VII was designed to eradicate. It
could be argued that the safety rationale is no different from the "health and safety" rules
that prohibited women from working particular jobs or working extended hours. Title VII
has been construed to place the right and responsibility for making these safety decisions
on the affected employees, not the employers.
263. As noted below, one or two instances of discriminatory assignments would not be
sufficiently severe to constitute an adverse employment action. See discussion infra note
267.
264. See discussion supra Part I.C.4.
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BFOQs,2 65 rationales that are equally applicable to a race or color
BFOQ.
3. A Dearth of Evidence of the Necessity for a Race BFOQ
Despite the fact that several rationales would support a race
BFOQ one could argue that a race BFOQ is not truly necessary in the
entertainment industry. There is not a single reported case in which
an actor has sued a director for race-based casting decisions, even
though it is common. 266 Similarly, no reporters have ever brought a
race-based assignment action against a television station or a newspa-
per publisher for refusing to assign them to a certain story, despite the
fact that such discriminatory assignments have most certainly oc-
curred with some frequency. 267 There are several possible explana-
tions for this dearth of litigation. 268
a. Lack of Awareness of Title VII
It may be that the victims of discrimination are not aware of their
Title VII rights. However, this seems unlikely, as discrimination suits
are common even among uneducated workers. Even if they do not
know the complete mechanics of a Title VII case, most people have at
least some awareness that race discrimination is unlawful and most are
265. See id.
266. See Peterson, supra note 6, at 355; Sheppard, supra note 230, at 279; Gary Williams,
"Don't Try to Adjust Your Television-I'm Black ": Ruminations on the Recurrent Controversy over
the Whiteness of TV 4 J. GENDER RACE &JUST. 99, 129 (2000).
267. Of course, it is doubtful that one or two instances of failing to assign a reporter to
a story would be sufficiently serious as to constitute an adverse employment action giving
rise to liability under Title VII. See Galabya v. New York City Bd. of Educ, 202 F.3d 636, 640
(2d Cir. 2000). "A plaintiff sustains an adverse employment action if he or she endures a
'materially adverse change' in the terms and conditions of employment. To be 'materially
adverse' a change in working conditions must be 'more disruptive than a mere inconve-
nience or an alteration of job responsibilities.'" Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
[A] plaintiff.., does not suffer an actionable injury unless there are some other
materially adverse consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of
her employment or her future employment opportunities such that a reasonable
trier of fact could conclude that the plaintiff has suffered objectively tangible
harm.
Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
268. The discussion of potential explanations that follows is not meant to be exhaus-
tive. For example, the lack of reported cases on the subject might be due to quick settle-
ment of the matter. Nevertheless, this possibility is not even discussed because it cannot
fully explain the absence of litigation addressing 'justifiable" discrimination in the news
and entertainment industry. Furthermore, many of the proposed explanations are not mu-
tually exclusive, and the dearth of litigation is probably best explained by a combination of
reasons.
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savvy enough to contact an attorney, particularly in light of the Ameri-
can proclivity for litigation.
b. Fear of Retaliation
A second possible explanation is that actors and reporters are
afraid that any complaints about discrimination will adversely affect
their careers; that their industries will blackball them for filing a
charge of discrimination. This belief might account for some of the
reticence to challenge the status quo in discriminatory job assign-
ments, but it is also an unlikely explanation for the lack of cases, par-
ticularly because many others in the entertainment industry have not
been shy about initiating lawsuits for perceived discrimination. 269 Fur-
thermore, many employees are aware of Title VII's anti-retaliation
provisions,270 which provide some protection to individuals who re-
port or oppose discriminatory practices.27' Fear of retaliation does not
fully explain this phenomenon.
c. Lack of Blatant Discrimination
A third suggested explanation is that many hiring decisions in the
entertainment industry are so subjective that potential plaintiffs never
know why they were not hired.272 For all an actor knows, he might not
have done well in the interview, or perhaps the hired individual had
more experience. Often an applicant lacks this kind of information
and is handicapped in attempting to determine the employer's true
motivations, which are difficult to ascertain under most circum-
269. See, e.g.,Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 501 (1lth
Cir. 2000) (discussing a radio station program host who claimed sexual harassment and
retaliation); Tutman v. WBBM-TV, 209 F.3d 1044 (7th Cir. 2000) (discussing a black can-
eraman who sued a television station for hostile environment race harassment); Parker v.
Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing an Americans with Disa-
bilities Act discriminatory discharge claim); Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745
(5th Cir. 1996) (discussing a radio disc jockey who claimed she was sexually harassed by
her supervisor); McCoy v. WGN Cont'l Broad. Co., 957 F.2d 368 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing
ADEA claim by a former employee of television station); Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766
F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985) (discussing a woman news anchor who initiated a sex discrimina-
tion suit against her employer based on its physical appearance standards); Nix v. WLCY
Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181 (lth Cir. 1984) (discussing a black disc
jockey who was fired for moonlighting and brought a disparate treatment action under
Tide VII).
270. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
271. See Rojas, 87 F.3d at 746 (discussing a radio disc jockey who sued for retaliation
based on her complaints about sexual harassment).
272. See Sheppard, supra note 230, at 274.
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stances. 273 Of course, employers usually are not foolish enough to ad-
vertise their discriminatory intentions.2 74 "No employer of even
moderate sophistication will admit or leave a paper record showing
that it has refused to hire, or has fired, a worker because of a worker's
race."275 Also relevant is the tenuous relationship actors have with po-
tential employers and their desire not to make false accusations that
might prevent them from obtaining jobs with this, or other, employers
in the future.
d. Belief That Title VII Does Not Apply
A fourth possible explanation is that potential plaintiffs mistak-
enly believe that Title VII does not apply to movie and television work-
ers. 276 Proponents of this theory do not explain how or why such a
mistaken belief arose-the theory fails to explain why someone aware
of Title VII would just assume that it does not apply to major Ameri-
can industries. The general awareness about the illegality of discrimi-
nation suggests that in itself this is not a satisfactory explanation.
e. First Amendment Considerations
A fifth explanation, related to the fourth, is that entertainers be-
lieve hiring and casting decisions are protected by the First Amend-
ment as forms of expressive conduct.2 77 Indeed, the Supreme Court
has interpreted the First Amendment to extend to "expressive con-
duct," such as burning flags278 and wearing armbands. 279 In the flag
burning case, Texas v. Johnson,"8 S the Supreme Court stated, "In decid-
ing whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative el-
273. See Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1484 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Particularly in
the discrimination area, it is often difficult to determine the motivations of an action and
any analysis is filled with pitfalls and ambiguities.").
274. "There will seldom be 'eyewitness testimony' as to the employer's mental
processes." United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983).
"[A]n employer who knowingly discriminates ... may leave no written records revealing
the forbidden motive and may communicate it orally to no one." LaMontage v. Am. Conve-
nience Prods., 750 F.2d 1405, 1410 (7th Cir. 1984). However, note the qualifiers "usually"
and "seldom." Apparently, some employers lack the guile to hide their discriminatory in-
tent. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (discussing an employer who stated in
a letter to the plaintiff that he would only employ men in certain positions).
275. Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513,
517-18 (1987).
276. See Williams, supra note 266, at 129.
277. See id.
278. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
279. See Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
280. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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ements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have asked
whether '[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present,
and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it. "'2 8 1 Although a full consideration
of the First Amendment as it relates to hiring decisions is beyond the
scope of this Article, it is arguable that if the casting of actors of a
certain race is necessary to convey a particular message to the audi-
ence, then hiring decisions based on this casting objective would re-
ceive First Amendment protection as "expressive conduct."
It is not surprising that the First Circuit has recognized the ten-
sion between the First Amendment and civil rights laws in the case of
race-specific casting.282 It opined, but did not hold, "that liability
should [not] attach if a performing group replaces a black performer
with a white performer (or vice versa) in order to further its expressive
interests."283 Were potential plaintiffs or their lawyers aware of this
reasoning, regardless of whether it is correct or not, it might explain a
reluctance to initiate a Title VII action based on casting decisions.
However, it is hard to believe that all the discriminatory hiring in the
art and entertainment industries is necessary to convey a distinct mes-
sage. Even if that were the case, it seems that some hearty soul would
at least have attempted to litigate the issue in order to test the parame-
ters of an otherwise all-encompassing defense.
f. Justifiable Discrimination
A sixth reason is that perhaps most people do not perceive any
problem with this form of discrimination, if they think about it at all.
They see casting decisions as a form of legitimate discrimination: a
justifiable refusal to assign an actor a role he is incapable of perform-
ing because his phenotypic properties prevent him from expressing
the ideas of the writer or director. As for reporters, people perceive
exclusion of certain races from certain assignments as necessary to ob-
tain a particular story and thus not invidious discrimination. As with
the recognized BFOQs, people see race as a necessary element of per-
forming the essence of the particular job. Senators Clark and Case
admitted as much when they responded that Title VII would not pre-
vent directors from casting actors according to the race assigned to
them in the script.284 In short, while Congress has not seen fit to enact
281. Id. at 404 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)).
282. See Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, 855 F.2d 888, 904 (1st Cir. 1988).
283. Id. at 904 n.17.
284. See 110 CONG. REc. 7217 (1964) (prepared statement of Sen. Clark & Sen. Case).
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a race BFOQ for these limited cases, the American people have
demonstrated their common sense in declining to pursue litigation in
these instances where they perceive race as a bona fide qualifica-
tion.28 5 Trial attorneys, who sometimes are not constrained by keen
moral perception, also have refrained from initiating such suits, again,
possibly because they realize they are contrary to common sense. Per-
haps it is more accurate to say that even plaintiffs' attorneys are read-
ing a race BFOQ into Title VII where none specifically exists, similar
to the way Judge Posner ascribed such a defense to an equal protec-
tion claim. 286
As one scholar has put it:
While it is true that the BFOQ defense does not recognize defenda-
ble racial discrimination, the statute undeniably permits some ra-
cial discrimination .... For example, it seems noncontroversial
that an FBI project to send an undercover agent to infiltrate the Ku
Klux Klan would specify the selection of a white agent.28 7
While it may be uncontroversial that as a matter of principle such an
assignment should not be unlawful, it is another thing to say that it
definitely does not violate Title VII. This view is a minority one, and no
court has yet been willing to adopt it. In fact, in dicta, the Fifth Circuit
has stated that this position is untenable. 288 In Miller v. Texas State
Board of Barber Examiners,289 after white inspectors refused to inspect
barber shops that catered to African-Americans, the state board pro-
moted the black plaintiff to an inspector position after agreeing to
inspect black shops. 290
Miller was assigned for years as an undercover investigator of black
barber shops because he is black. None of the white investigators
were assigned these duties for reasons easily understood; it is diffi-
285. This may be another example of what Jonathan Rauch calls the "hidden law"-
unwritten moral principles based on common sense, which frequently guide individual
conduct, often making legislation in an area unnecessary. See George F. Will, Wien Law
Replaces Common Sense, WASH. PosT, Dec. 24, 2000, 2000 WL 29923843.
In a dense and diverse society, Rauch says, moral disputes and collisions of clash-
ing sensibilities are incessant. But civilized life depends on informal rules and
measures-social winks, so to speak-preventing such mundane conflicts from
becoming legal extravaganzas or occasions for moral exhibitionism. Otherwise
communities become neurotic, quick to take offense, slow to assuage it.
Id.
286. See Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996), discussed supra Part IV.B.
287. Peter Brandon Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of Discrimination
Under 7itle VII, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 823 n.215 (1987) (citation omitted).
288. See Miller v. Tex. State Bd. of Barber Exam'rs, 615 F.2d 650, 654 (5th Cir. 1980).
289. 615 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1980).
290. See id. at 651.
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cult to imagine a caucasian successfully disguised as a shoeshine
boy in or as a patron of an all black barber shop. 29 1
Despite the court's admission of the necessity of assigning an African-
American man to undercover investigations, the court stated that it
would not recognize a race BFOQ because it would be contrary to the
plain meaning of the BFOQ provision, in which race "is conspicuously
absent."292
g. Most Discrimination in the News and Entertainment Industries
Is Benign
As long as people continue to act reasonably and refuse to seek
judicial relief for this limited form of discrimination, it seems unlikely
that any congressional action will be required. Recently some minori-
ties have become highly critical of the television networks and theatri-
cal production companies for the "whiteness" of news and
entertainment personnel. 293 These critics might inspire plaintiffs to
litigate these intentional discrimination cases, and if this occurs, it is
probable that some courts might resort to creating a race BFOO de-
spite their questionable authority to do so. On the other hand, if
courts correctly perceive themselves as powerless to craft a race BFOQ
and white plaintiffs claim that they were discriminated against because
directors would not cast them as Malcolm X or Bishop Tutu, then
juries may be wholly unsympathetic because of their perceived irra-
tionality of the claim, leaving the plaintiffs without remedy. 294 Because
291. Id. at 653-54.
292. Id. at 652. This statement is dicta, however, as the court found that the plaintiff
was not complaining about his discriminatory assignments, but about his discharge. See id.
While the assignment to only black barber shops was obviously discriminatory, the court
held that the discharge was based on the defendant's failure to follow orders rather than
his race. See id. at 654.
293. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 266, at 100; see also Robert Millar, Comment, Racism Is
in the Air: The FCC's Mandate to Protect Minorities from Getting Shortchanged by Advertisers, 8
CoMMLAw CONSPECrUS 311, 325 (2000).
294. Undoubtedly this is a form ofjury nullification, a practice much criticized by both
the political right and left depending on whose ox is being gored at any given time. De-
spite this criticism, nobody doubts thatjury nullification still occurs in the United States. As
Senator Underwood once stated:
[A]ny law that you put on the statute books, in the last analysis must come to the
jury box for its enforcement. It may be asked, "Will the jury violate its oath; will a
jury go against the testimony and acquit a man who has been proven to be guilty?"
I do not say ajury should by right or by honesty of purpose do so, but I do say that
juries do that, have done it, and will continue to do it when you write laws on the
statute books against the approval of the people you seek to govern. You know
that when, in old England it was a crime punished by death for a man to steal a
chicken, juries refused to convict ....
Spring 20011 RACE BFOQ IN ENTERTAINMENT
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
congressional action is expensive, 295 it is only warranted if courts are
truly powerless to create a race BFOQ. Further, legislative action is
only warranted if courts are inundated with discrimination cases that a
race BFOQ could resolve fairly. As this scenario is highly unlikely, it
seems that calls for a congressional amendment of Title VII to include
a race or color BFOQ are much ado about nothing.
h. Creative Casting
The fact that actors can sometimes successfully portray characters
of other races further supports the lack of a need for a race BFOQ in
the entertainment industry. 29 6 Indeed, a furor recently erupted over
the use of a white man to portray a character who was supposed to be
Eurasian in the musical Miss Saigon.297 The director strongly defended
his casting decision on the grounds of artistic freedom. 298 However,
the important point is that if the director could justify this practice in
the Miss Saigon situation, it seems that discriminatory hiring for pur-
poses of "realistic" casting may not be wholly necessary, especially if
skin coloring is used to make actors appear a different color. "Make-
up and costumes often disguise actors to appear like people that they
are not, including people of another racial identity."2 91
Additionally, many types of shows do not truly need actors of one
race or another to convey the intended message, °0 1 particularly be-
cause the show is already asking the audience to use its imagination to
appreciate the show. For example, in many fables, the race of the ac-
tors portraying fictional characters does not matter. Even though di-
rectors might desire racial consistency among family members, it is
hard to say that such discrimination is "required."
A serious drama presented in a naturalistic style may be dependent
on the ability of the performer to appear realistic, but a comedy, a
farce, a fable, a fantasy or a surrealistic or absurdist work will gener-
ally be less dependent on reality and may, on the contrary, even
benefit from incongruity in casting.3 04 1
Because the entertainment industry frequently suspends the normal
rules of reality, it would not be overly burdensome to ask the audience
54 CONG. REC. 485-86 (1917) (statement of Sen. Underwood).
295. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 590 (1998).
296. See Peterson, supra note 6, at 354.
297. See Sheppard, supra note 230, at 267.
298. See id. at 269.
299. Chen, supra note 231, at 517 n.18.
300. See Peterson, sura note 6, at 362 ("[M]any realistic works do not require racial
specificity because race is not an issue in the plot.").
301. Id. at 359.
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to perceive a costumed African-American as King. George III, or a
white man as Chairman Mao. 30 2 Imagination is the key to all en-
tertainment, and one could hardly characterize asking an audience to
contribute a greater dose of it as a defect.
B. Enactment of a Race BFOQ Could Have Detrimental
Consequences
Besides the apparent lack of a need for a race BFOQ, there are
several other reasons why a race BFOQ might be ill-advised, at least
with respect to the entertainment industry. For starters, some defend-
ants might not be able to meet the stringent BFOQ standards that
some courts impose. As discussed above, the concept of what charac-
teristics are reasonably necessary to the essence of the defendant's
business is not clear. Although courts consider sex discrimination as
appropriate to accommodate a customer preference for privacy, they
also consider it unjustified in most other cases of customer prefer-
ence, 303 especially with respect to race. 30 4 Were courts to apply a simi-
lar type of privacy versus customer preference distinction to a race
BFOQ many movie directors might not fare so well. For example,
could a director show that using an entirely white cast for a science
fiction film such as Star Wars is truly necessary to serve the essential
interests of the business? Considering that the characters would all be
fictional and that African-Americans can act just as well as whites,
there seems to be little basis for claiming that the use of only white
actors is reasonably necessary.
1. Engendering Racial Discrimination
Furthermore, why should films depicting historical events be enti-
tled to more protection than fictional movies? Since the audience
must use a certain amount of imagination to appreciate a movie any-
way, it does not seem reasonably necessary for a white man to play the
part of Richard M. Nixon. Presumably, the people would understand
and appreciate a production regardless of whether an African-Ameri-
302. As to playing Mao, some Congressmen thought that excluding non-Asians from
the role would be discrimination based on national origin, and thus exempted by the
BFOQ provision, and not discrimination based on race. See 110 CONG. REC. 2559 (1964)
(statement of Rep. Williams). Actually, depending on the hiring parameters, it could be
both national origin discrimination and race discrimination.
303. See, e.g., Bollenbach v. Bd. of Educ., 659 F. Supp. 1450, 1453, 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
("[T]he fact that the Hasidic clientele strongly prefer male [bus] drivers does not make
being male a BFOQ.").
304. See Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1982).
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can was playing the part. Recall from the most recent movie on Nixon
that Anthony Hopkins played the part of the fallen President despite
the fact that the actor bore no resemblance to the former president.
With all due respect to Sir Anthony, a black man could have produced
an equally entertaining movie; thus the casting of a white actor was
not reasonably necessary and a race BFOQ should not protect the
casting decision. Although it could be argued that the industry would
be no worse off with the enactment of a race BFOQ provision, as there
presently is no protection for this type of discrimination, such an en-
actment might catalyze a flood of litigation as lawyers attempt to dis-
cern the contours of a new provision. Discrimination that remains
unchallenged because people presently consider it innocuous could
become fodder for litigation over the boundaries of a newly minted
race BFOQ.
2. Expanding Artistic Freedom
Of course, directors faced with such a dilemma would argue that
"artistic freedom" is essential to their work, and it is necessary that
they retain the right to select the race of the actors who will portray
specific characters.t 5 This argument probably has its greatest appeal
in the context of historical productions. For instance, while it would
have been interesting to see Gone With the Wind produced with whites
playing the parts of the slaves and blacks as the ruling class, the racial
casting in itself is a form of communication, and the message commu-
nicated by this casting may not be the message that the director or
writer chose to communicate. Undoubtedly, this argument has some
merit, and a director may persuade a court that is deferential to artis-
tic freedom. However, a glance at present cases that narrowly construe
the "reasonably necessary" test in regard to BFOQs suggests that even
productions hoping to remain historically accurate with respect to ra-
cial casting might fail the test. Why should a director's desire to send a
particular "message" to customers receive greater protection than an
airline that seeks to send a different message to its customers by hiring
only beautiful women as flight attendants?"0°6 Perhaps artistic freedom
deserves more protection than commercial freedom, but if the recent
305. See Sheppard, supra note 230, at 269.
306. See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 295 n.7 (N.D. Tex. 1981)
(noting Southwest Airlines built its business "by employing attractive female flight attend-
ants"). As noted below, Title VII does not make unattractiveness a protected attribute, so
only men, and not unattractive women who were similarly excluded by the hiring policy,
could sue under Title VII. See infra notes 325-27 and accompanying text.
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First Amendment commercial speech cases are any indication of the
value society places on commercial speech vis-A-vis other speech, the
artists will have a tough time proving their case. 307
3. Sustaining Societal Discrimination
There are still further concerns about creating a race BFOQ. Spe-
cifically, it may actually promote the racist attitudes purportedly driv-
ing consumers in their selection of entertainment: when given a
choice, whites tend to watch movies and television programs contain-
ing white actors.308 Entertainment executives use this consumer
choice argument to justify the lack of minorities in the industry. 30 9
Their reasoning goes like this: since most Americans are white3l and
tend to watch movies and television programs featuring whites, 311
there is a greater probability of producing significant income when
directors cast white actors in movies and programs. 31 2 Because the
production companies and networks are businesses and must make
money to survive and compete, these businesses seek to provide the
majority of consumers with the goods they most want, so that the com-
307. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) ("I do not see a philosophical or historical basis for asserting that 'commercial'
speech is of 'lower value' than 'noncommercial' speech.").
308. See Brian Lowry et al., Networks Decide Diversity Doesn't Pay, L.A. TIMES, July 20, 1999,
at Al ("TV viewers are becoming more racially fragmented-choosing to watch shows with
characters that look like they do.").
309. See id. ("[S]ome insiders maintain that the real cause of minorities being
marginalized has to do simply with audience tastes.").
310. See id. ("Whites are still projected by the Census Bureau to account for more than
70% of the population between the ages of 18 and 54-the broad demographic coveted by
media buyers-in 2000.").
311. See id. ("Just a decade ago, . . .white viewers were much more willing to watch
shows that featured predominately African American casts .... Not so today."); see also Eric
Deggans, Hits and Duds Series: 2000: A Year in Culture, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 31, 2000,
LEXIS, St. Petersburg Times File ("Thanks to City of Angels, skittish networks will likely
conclude white audiences won't watch black dramas."). This rationale breaks down, how-
ever, when one considers that whites do in fact pay to see black actors and actresses. Al-
though the stated rationale presumably has some basis in reality (the entertainment
industry presumably knows what is in its best financial interests), it is also possible that
producers and directors are mistaken as to what consumers really want. It may be that their
beliefs are based on white reaction to poor quality productions that just happened to cast
many blacks, and not to the black actors themselves.
312. See Lowry et al., supra note 308, at Al ("Networks can't afford to alienate whites,
who make up the vast majority of potential viewers, and remain the ones advertisers pri-
vately concede they want most.").
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panies can in turn make more money for their investors.313 Put an-
other way:
[T]he color of the faces we see on any screen, and the way those
faces are portrayed, are simply a matter of economics. For these
observers, the whiteness of television is a product of supply and
demand, and nothing more. They argue that if the American pub-
lic wants to see more faces of color on the small screen acting in
serious dramas and high-minded comedies, people will watch City
of Angels, Cosby, The Practice, and other shows that presently feature
actors of color performing in a dignified manner. Once the de-
mand for these shows becomes manifest, critics argue, advertisers
and network executives will request, and producers will produce,
more of those shows. 3 14
These individuals believe that "producers and directors will not
spend their talents and resources to create a product which does not
have a potentially large audience. '' 31 5 This explanation is a straightfor-
ward application of basic economic principles, and nobody seriously
doubts that most producers would gladly cast minorities instead of
whites if the minorities would prove more profitable. 31 6 "Advertisers
are colorblind, said Paul Schulman, whose Schulman/Advanswers NY
Agency is one of the largest buyers of network ad time. 'If it delivers
[viewers age] 18 to 49, count them in; if it doesn't, count them out' he
said."317
The problem with accepting this consumer preference rationale,
however, is that it is similar to the rationale behind the old Jim Crow
employment laws in the South, e.g. "we have to have separate dining
rooms for blacks because the majority of consumers (whites) will not
eat with blacks and that will hurt our bottom-line," or "we do not em-
ploy blacks because our customers would prefer to deal with whites."
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 rejected this justification for discrimina-
tion, regardless of whether it accurately reflected the views of consum-
ers. Title VII of the Act specifically rejected the notion that the
consumers' racial prejudice should dictate an employer's hiring deci-
sions,318 regardless of cost to employers. Of course, African-Americans
are not the only group to have suffered from the entertainment indus-
313. See Heekyung Esther Kim, Note, Race as a Hiring/Casting Criterion: If Laurence Oli-
vier Was Rejected for the Role of Othello in Othello, Would He Have a Valid Title VII Claim?, 20
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 397, 399 (1998).
314. Williams, supra note 266, at 111 (footnotes omitted).
315. Id.
316. But see id. at 109 ("[T]he creators of television series do not think about including
actors of color in new series.").
317. Lowry et al., supra note 308, at Al (alteration in original).
318. See Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1982).
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try's pandering to consumer preference. Many other groups complain
that actors with their attributes are under-represented in movies and
television, including Asian doctors,319 women, , 20 and in particular eld-
erly women, 321 the disabled, 32 Hispanics, 323 and East Indians.32 4 Any
under-casting is arguably due to the consumers' preferences or
prejudices.
These same consumer prejudices and preferences keep networks
and theaters from producing many programs featuring unattractive or
obese people.3 25 Fortunately for the employers in the entertainment
industry, these qualities are not statutorily protected attributes,3 26 at
least not yet on the federal level.327
319. See Forrest G. Wood, Editorial, Ethnic Diversity in TV Roles, L.A. TIMES, July 25,
1999, at M4 ("One out of six medical doctors in the U.S. is of Asian Ancestry; but not one
actor with a recurring role in 'L.A. Doctors,' 'Chicago Hope' or 'ER' is Asian.").
320. See Sharon Waxman, More Film, ?V Roles Go to Minorities, PITr. POsT-GAzEIrE, Dec.
24, 2000, LEXIS, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette File ("[W] omen-more than half of the U.S. pop-
ulation-were cast in 38 percent of the roles in movies and television.").
321. See id. ("Women ... also suffer more from ageism; women over 40 got only 24
percent of female roles, compared to 36 percent for men of that age group.").
322. See Tom Feran, Disabled Gained and Lost Ground on TV, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Dec. 16, 2000, LEXIS, San Diego Union-Tribune File ("But actors and characters with disa-
bilities have only recently begun making wider inroads on TV, and advocates say the 54
million Americans with disabilities remain television's 'invisible minority' . . . .").
323. See Lynn Elber, Book Tells Forgotten Story, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 13, 2000, LEXIS,
Chicago Sun-Times File ("Minorities other than blacks tend to be invisible on network
television, according to a coalition of civil rights groups.").
324. See Viral Bhanyani & Nona Walia, Indian Actors Are Making It Big on American Prime
Time, TIMES OF INDIA, Nov. 12, 2000, 2000 WL 29242110.
325. In fact, there are probably fewer overweight or unattractive actresses on the major
networks today than there are racial or ethnic minorities, despite the fact that twenty-five
percent of Americans are clinically obese, and more than sixty percent are overweight. See
Philip Brasher, Moderate-Fat Diets Are Best, U.S. Report Says High-Fat, Low-Carb Plan Called Thin
on Nutrition, CHI. TRIB.,Jan. 11, 2001, 2001 WL 4028901.Just as with the "thin flight attend-
ant" cases discussed above, see supra Part I.B.1, women have a much worse time with beauty
or weight discrimination than men. For example, portly actors like Drew Carey, John
Goodman,Jason Alexander, and the late John Candy, John Belushi, and Chris Farley were
able to succeed on television and the big screen, although it is worth noting that their
success only came in the comedy milieu, probably because it is considered acceptable to
laugh at fat people. These actors were seldom, if ever, cast as action heroes or the love
interests in serious dramas. As for comparably successful and overweight women, only
Oprah Winfrey, Roseanne Barr, and Kathy Bates come to mind.
326. Actually, this may be a slight overstatement, as some courts have recognized that
obesity is a disease, and if it is a permanent condition, persons suffering from it are pro-
tected under the ADA. Cf Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 1997)
(stating that obesity is not usually a "physical impairment" within the meaning of the ADA,
except in cases where obesity relates to a physiological disorder).
327. This Article is not advocating that the anti-discrimination laws should be extended
to regulate discrimination against the obese or physically unattractive. The point is that,
presuming obesity and physical unattractiveness are for many people immutable character-
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It seems that major portions of the entertainment industry have
had a free ride, or at least purchased their tickets at a discount, since
it has not borne the full costs of Title VII that other employers
have.3 28 Providing the industry with BFOQ protection for discrimina-
tory hiring practices could deprive potential plaintiffs of a cause of
action against unjustifiable discrimination. While certain instances dis-
cussed above, such as the need to use undercover reporters of a partic-
ular race, 3 29 could warrant a race BFOQ in the context of non-
historical theatrical productions, the racial discrimination could be
just another manifestation of the Jim Crow laws. Because any race
BFOQ would presumably apply to all industries, there is an increased
danger that it would insulate more invidious forms of race discrimina-
tion than it would exculpate benign forms. This situation was the con-
cern of the Congressmen who opposed adding race or color to the
BFOQ provision. 33° Their concerns are as legitimate today as they
were in 1964.
There is also a danger that courts could interpret a race BFOQ to
protect a broad range of conduct that Title VII was enacted to avoid.
The entertainment industry might use it as a tool to solidify the pur-
ported "whiteness" that presently characterizes movies and television.
The heightened scrutiny presently used by courts to assess asserted
BFOQs would go a long way towards eliminating any unwarranted re-
course to a race BFOQ. Thus, courts presumably would recognize that
the race of a musician is not "reasonably necessary" to the music he or
she produces. However, to the extent that authenticity would be an
acceptable justification for a BFOQ any employer that was intent on
excluding African-Americans need only change the name of the band
to something denoting that the members are white, European, or An-
glo-Saxon. Presumably, then, a race or color BFOQ would afford that
employer protection. 331 While many a band would be unwilling to
istics like race or sex, the discrimination that these groups face is no less hurtful or invidi-
ous than much of the discrimination regulated by Title VII, and the consumers of
entertainment goods similarly discriminate on these bases.
328. This is not to suggest that the news and entertainment industries have not been
defendants in employment litigation. The assertion is simply that the race discrimination
that must be occurring in these industries seems to have been largely ignored.
329. See discussion supra Part V.A.2.
330. See 110 CONG. Rhc. 2556 (1964) (statement of Rep. O'Hara) ("The trouble with
the amendment offered by the gentleman from Mississippi is that it opens up a good deal
more than the case of a casting director looking for actors to play certain roles in a dra-
matic production.").
331. It is essentially the same principle that protects French restaurants when they dis-
criminate against non-French chefs, even though national origin sometimes makes no dif-
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change its name, it seems likely that those most intent on discriminat-
ing would find a name change to be a minor inconvenience if it re-
sulted in a free pass to discriminate. While this situation is probably
rare, it must be asked whether the benefits gained from a race or
color BFOQ for "legitimate" discrimination outweigh the cost of af-
fording protection to invidious discrimination.
In light of these concerns, Congress must carefully consider any
attempt to insulate race or color discrimination. No plaintiff has yet to
complain about the present employment practices of the news and
entertainment industries. Only a few other employers have sought to
defend their discriminatory practices based on a race BFOQ. Thus,
enactment of a race BFOQ seems highly premature at this point in
time. Law works best when applied to concrete situations, and so it
would be better to wait and see whether cases involving race and color
discrimination actually arise in the entertainment industry. At that
point, Congress could implement a more knowledgeable and rea-
soned response than is presently possible.
Conclusion
Although courts are willing to recognize an authenticity justifica-
tion for BFOQs, the fact that Congress intentionally elected not to
enact a BFOQ for race or color prevents courts from judicially creat-
ing one even to protect the authenticity of theatrical productions. In
short,. the rules of statutory construction and judicial restraint prevent
the judiciary from crafting a race or color BFOQ. Legislative action
seems to be the only recourse, but it is unlikely to be forthcoming
since there is not a single case demonstrating the need for a race
BFOQ to protect the news and entertainment industries, or any other
industries, except perhaps prisons. Furthermore, the fear that employ-
ers could misuse a generally applicable race BFOQ to shield invidious
race discrimination is too great to warrant the enactment of such a
provision without a real and credible threat to the benign employ-
ment decisions of the news and entertainment industries. Thus, de-
spite some suggestions in the legal literature to the contrary, these
industries seem to be doing quite well without a race or color BFOQ.
ference in the product produced. The same holds true for the national origin or race of
musicians.
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